| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Nickname profile can panic with an out-of-bounds slice error when transforming crafted input into a short destination buffer. |
| A malicious txtar could escape the intended execution context and force arbitrary writes to the playground host's trusted filesystem.
Disjointly, one of the three possible paths to invoke go vet on the playground host did not correctly restrict the execution environment. This permitted a Go process to make a read for an environment configuration file rooted in the playground host's $HOME.
Together, a well-crafted go env file and the go vet invocation could lead to remote code execution in the playground host itself.
This does not affect users of go.dev/play directly; however, it may affect independent deployments of golang.org/x/playground. |
| gopls by default communicates via pipe. However, -port and -listen flags are supported as means of debugging.
If -listen is given a value without an explicit host (e.g. :8080), or -port is used, gopls will listen on 0.0.0.0.
As a result, users might inadvertently cause gopls to bind 0.0.0.0.
This can allow a malicious party on the same network to execute code arbitrarily via gopls. |
| Pathological inputs could cause DoS through consumePhrase when parsing an email address according to RFC 5322. |
| The ToASCII and ToUnicode functions incorrectly accept Punycode-encoded labels that decode to an ASCII-only label. For example, ToUnicode("xn--example-.com") incorrectly returns the name "example.com" rather than an error. This behavior can lead to privilege escalation in programs using the idna package. For example, a program which performs privilege checks on the ASCII hostname may reject "example.com" but permit "xn--example-.com". If that program subsequently converts the ASCII hostname to Unicode, it will inadvertently permits access to the Unicode name "example.com". |
| Well-crafted inputs reaching ParseAddress, ParseAddressList, and ParseDate were able to trigger excessive CPU exhaustion and memory allocations. |
| Previously, a revoked 'SignatureKey' belonging to a CA was not correctly checked for revocation. Now, both the 'key' and 'key.SignatureKey' are checked for @revoked. |
| When adding a key to a remote agent constraint extensions such as restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com were not serialized in the request. Destination restrictions were silently stripped when forwarding keys, allowing unrestricted use of the key on the remote host. The client now serializes all constraint extensions. Additionally, the in-memory keyring returned by NewKeyring() now rejects keys with unsupported constraint extensions instead of silently ignoring them. |
| A malicious SSH peer could send unsolicited global request responses to fill an internal buffer, blocking the connection's read loop. The blocked goroutine could not be released by calling Close(), resulting in a resource leak per connection. Unsolicited global responses are now discarded. |
| The RSA and DSA public key parsers did not enforce size limits on key parameters. A crafted public key with an excessively large modulus or DSA parameter could cause several minutes of CPU consumption during signature verification. This could be triggered by unauthenticated clients during public key authentication. RSA moduli are now limited to 8192 bits, and DSA parameters are validated per FIPS 186-2. |
| When processing HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames, transport will enter an infinite loop of writing CONTINUATION frames if it receives a SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE with a value of 0. |
| When using LookupCNAME with the cgo DNS resolver, a very long CNAME response can trigger a double-free of C memory and a crash. |
| Previously, CVE-2024-45337 fixed an authorization bypass for misused ssh server configurations; if any other type of callback is passed other than public key, then the source-address validation would be skipped. |
| SSH servers which use CertChecker as a public key callback without setting IsUserAuthority or IsHostAuthority could be caused to panic by a client presenting a certificate. CertChecker now returns an error instead of panicking when these callbacks are nil. |
| When an SSH server authentication callback returned PartialSuccessError with non-nil Permissions, those permissions were silently discarded, potentially dropping certificate restrictions such as force-command after a second factor succeeded. Returning non-nil Permissions with PartialSuccessError now results in a connection error. |
| Previously, a channel registered in the mux's chanList is not usable until it is established. A malicious peer was able flood the channel's incomingRequests, deadlocking the entire connection. Now, we add an atomic established state, set when a channel becomes usable. Until such a time, handlePacket drops every packet other than the open confirmation/failure, without blocking and without tearing down the connection. |
| Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking. |
| The source-address critical option in the Permissions returned by an authentication callback was only enforced for the PublicKeyCallback and VerifiedPublicKeyCallback paths, extending the fix for CVE-2026-46595. Permissions returned by the PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, NoClientAuthCallback, and GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin callbacks were not validated against the client's remote address, so a source-address restriction set by those callbacks was silently ignored. The check is now applied to the Permissions returned by any authentication callback. |
| VP8L decoding in golang.org/x/image/vp8l can allocate an excessive amount of memory when processing a crafted VP8L image containing many unused Huffman tree groups. This allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via memory exhaustion. |
| A malicious GOSUMDB was capable of serving arbitrary module content not contained within the transparency log. This attack allows for a coordinating GOPROXY and GOSUMDB to serve a client malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log. In order to determine if you have been affected: rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ && go mod tidy |
