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Search Results (28331 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-96930 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS) allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-111711 | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical | ||
| Netcore NR256CN through 1.5.140116 contains a pre-authentication stack overflow vulnerability in the Boa web server's user_ok() function, which copies Basic-auth usernames with unbounded strcpy() calls into 64-byte stack buffers. Unauthenticated attackers can send a username longer than 63 bytes to any protected /router/*.cgi route to crash the main Boa process or potentially execute code. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97005 | 1 Microsoft | 13 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft 365 Apps For Enterprise and 10 more | 2026-10-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office PowerPoint allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-101337 | 1 Nlnetlabs | 1 Nsd | 2026-10-16 | N/A |
| When base64 data is split up in pieces, of 3 character or less, tokens were incorrectly calculated to produce 0 bytes. This enables attackers to overwrite the stack with up to 64K of attacker controlled data. Zone files which are written out by NSD itself, such as for zones for which the NSD instance is secondary, will not be formatted like this. The zone file must be fed to NSD directly, (but it could come, for example, from an operator controlled provisioning system). | ||||
| CVE-2026-101338 | 1 Nlnetlabs | 1 Nsd | 2026-10-16 | N/A |
| When a SVCB or HTTPS RR has filled the wire format RDATA up to the brim, another ECH parameter may overwrite the stack, and once beyond the limit, the base64 decoder can write attacker controlled data of unlimited size. Zone files which are written out by NSD itself, such as for zones for which the NSD instance is secondary, will not be formatted like this. The zone file must be fed to NSD directly, (but it could come, for example, from an operator controlled provisioning system). | ||||
| CVE-2026-101339 | 1 Nlnetlabs | 1 Nsd | 2026-10-16 | N/A |
| A HIP resource record that fills the RDATA near or at is limit, and has another dname RDATA field (a HIP Rendezvous server) can overwrite the stack with up to 191 bytes of attacker controlled data. Zone files which are written out by NSD itself, such as for zones for which the NSD instance is secondary, will not be formatted like this. The zone file must be fed to NSD directly, (but it could come, for example, from an operator controlled provisioning system). | ||||
| CVE-2026-101341 | 1 Nlnetlabs | 1 Nsd | 2026-10-16 | N/A |
| Tokens of text in RDATA (of for example TXT records) under 32 bytes are not checked to stay within the space reserved for the RDATA allowing for arbitrary sized out of bound stack writes, including an overwrite of a callback function pointer which is called directly after parse. Zone files which are written out by NSD itself, such for zones for which the NSD instance is secondary, will not be formatted like this. The zone file must be fed to NSD directly, (but it could come, for example, from an operator controlled provisioning system). | ||||
| CVE-2026-101927 | 1 Juniper Networks | 2 Junos Os, Junos Os Evolved | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| A Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in eventd of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved on all platforms allows an unprivileged local attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) or achieve privilege escalation to root via crafted IPC event messages. | ||||
| CVE-2026-101310 | 1 Freebsd | 1 Freebsd | 2026-10-16 | 7 High |
| The HDA audio device model did not check for zero-length Buffer Descriptor List (BDL) entries when starting a stream. A zero-length entry caused an out-of-bounds read or write during DMA transfer processing. BDL fields were also subject to modification by the guest after validation. A malicious guest can crash the bhyve process or potentially execute arbitrary code in the host userspace context running the virtual machine, subject to bhyve's Capsicum sandbox. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97744 | 1 Microsoft | 13 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft 365 Apps For Enterprise and 10 more | 2026-10-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office PowerPoint allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97001 | 1 Microsoft | 11 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021 and 8 more | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-100130 | 1 Adobe | 1 Substance 3d Sampler | 2026-10-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| Substance3D - Sampler is affected by an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that could lead to disclosure of sensitive memory. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to disclose sensitive information. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. | ||||
| CVE-2026-100131 | 1 Adobe | 1 Substance 3d Sampler | 2026-10-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| Substance3D - Sampler is affected by an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that could lead to disclosure of sensitive memory. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to disclose sensitive information. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. | ||||
| CVE-2026-100126 | 1 Adobe | 1 Adobe Bridge | 2026-10-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| Bridge is affected by an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that could lead to disclosure of sensitive memory. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to disclose sensitive information. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. | ||||
| CVE-2025-29897 | 1 Qnap Systems | 1 Qsync Central | 2026-10-16 | N/A |
| A buffer copy without checking size of input vulnerability has been reported to affect Qsync Central. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to modify memory or crash processes. We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version: Qsync Central 5.0.0.4 and later | ||||
| CVE-2026-77396 | 2 Pjsip, Teluu | 2 Pjproject, Pjsip | 2026-10-16 | 7.1 High |
| PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library written in C. In 2.17 and earlier, the PJSIP AVI parser in pjmedia/src/pjmedia/avi_player.c uses an input-file video chunk length as the number of bytes copied into a frame buffer whose capacity is derived from the declared media dimensions. A crafted AVI file can therefore cause an attacker-controlled out-of-bounds write past the heap allocation when an application plays the file or pulls its frames. The existing size assertion does not protect production release builds, where assertions are disabled. Typical local playback can crash the process, while applications that accept untrusted AVI sources expose a stronger memory-corruption condition. No fixed version is available as of this review. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89649 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: bound xattr value length in __build_xattrs() __build_xattrs() decodes the MDS-supplied xattr blob one attribute at a time. For each attribute it reads a 32-bit name length, advances past the name bytes, reads a 32-bit value length, records the value pointer, and advances past the value bytes. The two length fields are read with ceph_decode_32_safe(), but the value bytes themselves are advanced over with a bare "p += len" and no ceph_decode_need() check that "len" bytes remain in the blob. For every attribute except the last, the next iteration's ceph_decode_32_safe() on the following name length implicitly verifies that the previous value did not run past the blob end. The final attribute has no successor, so its decoded value length is never checked against the blob bounds. A malicious or compromised metadata server can set the last attribute's value length larger than the bytes actually present in the blob. The blob is a dedicated kvmalloc() allocation sized to the wire length (ceph_buffer_new() in ceph_fill_inode()). __set_xattr() records the oversized length in xattr->val_len verbatim, and a later getxattr(2) runs memcpy(value, xattr->val, xattr->val_len) into a user-supplied buffer, copying bytes past the end of the allocation back to user space. Impact: a malicious metadata server discloses adjacent kernel heap bytes to a local user via getxattr(2) on a CephFS file. Add the missing ceph_decode_need() so an out-of-bounds value length on the final attribute fails the decode and returns -EIO instead of being stored. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89542 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf->len - base to xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base <= buf->len. When a caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len leaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow: gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf) ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset ec = *(ptr + 4) /* OOB read on short head */ rrc = *(ptr + 6) /* OOB read on short head */ rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc) xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base) /* u32 wrap when base > len */ _rotate_left(&subbuf, shift) shift %= buf->len /* divide-by-zero when base == len */ After decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has the same shape: movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > buf->head[0].iov_len); The BUG_ON re-adds the value just subtracted, so it reduces to min(A, B) > A and is permanently false; it cannot catch the unsigned underflow of movelen, which then drives a ~UINT_MAX-byte memmove(). Add four defense-in-depth guards inside the unwrap core so it is safe regardless of what its callers validate: - reject tokens with len - offset < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN before touching ptr+4/ptr+6; - bail from rotate_left() when buf->len <= base, covering both the underflow and zero-length cases; - return early from _rotate_left() when buf->len is zero, so the shift %= buf->len modulo cannot fault; - replace the dead BUG_ON with a live check that returns GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN before the movelen subtraction. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89541 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks gss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base; if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf); Both operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with opaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small value that is below rcv_buf->len, so the bound check passes and gss_unwrap() is called with end < begin. The check also lacks a lower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is accepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt header reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token. A krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive the client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the rotate_left() loop that follows. Fix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that are safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum outer token length: if (offset > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) goto unwrap_failed; The first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard unconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful xdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already satisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added in commit 5b757c2e57a5 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89532 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks When a parsed chunk list contains a chunk whose ch_segcount is zero, pcl_for_each_segment computes its inclusive upper bound as &chunk->ch_segments[ch_segcount - 1]. ch_segcount is u32, so the subtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF and the bound lands far past the ch_segments flex array. The loop body then walks unrelated memory at sizeof(struct svc_rdma_segment) stride until it faults. A zero-segcount chunk is reachable from the wire: xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount values greater than rc_maxpages, and pcl_alloc_write() links a freshly allocated chunk onto rc_write_pcl/rc_reply_pcl before its segment-fill loop runs, so a Write or Reply chunk advertising zero segments leaves ch_segcount == 0 on the list. When the transport has negotiated Send-With-Invalidate, svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() iterates all four PCLs with pcl_for_each_segment and dereferences segment->rs_handle on each iteration, turning the underflow into an out-of-bounds read and a general protection fault. xdr_check_write_list / xdr_check_reply_chunk pcl_alloc_write() chunk = pcl_alloc_chunk(...) /* ch_segcount = 0 */ list_add_tail(&chunk->ch_list, &pcl->cl_chunks) /* fill loop iterates zero times for wire segcount 0 */ svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() pcl_for_each_chunk(rc_write_pcl) pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk) pos <= &ch_segments[0u - 1u] /* 0xFFFFFFFF */ segment->rs_handle /* OOB read -> GPF */ Fix by switching the macro to a half-open upper bound that uses ch_segcount directly. For ch_segcount == 0 the loop start equals the loop end and the body is skipped; for ch_segcount > 0 the iteration range is unchanged. All six existing call sites in net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c and net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c remain correct under the new bound, so no caller changes are needed. | ||||