| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received
picolcd_debug_eeprom_read() trusts resp->raw_data[2] -- a length byte
supplied by the device in its REPORT_EE_DATA reply -- clamped only to
the caller's read() count:
ret = resp->raw_data[2];
if (ret > s)
ret = s;
if (copy_to_user(u, resp->raw_data+3, ret))
It never checks resp->raw_size, the number of bytes picolcd_raw_event()
actually copied into the 64-byte raw_data[] of the kmalloc'd struct
picolcd_pending. A device (or a spoofed picoLCD) returning a length byte
of 0xff, read with a count >= 255, makes copy_to_user() read past
raw_data[] into adjacent slab memory and return it to userspace through
the debugfs "eeprom" file:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user
Read of size 255 ... picolcd_debug_eeprom_read+0x214/0x2f0 [hid_picolcd]
The debug-dump path in the same file already validates the device length
byte against the received size before trusting it; this read does not.
The file is created S_IRUSR (root-only) and a crafted device is needed,
so it is neither unprivileged- nor remotely-triggerable.
Clamp the copy length to resp->raw_size - 3 (the payload actually
received, minus the 3-byte header), floored at 0 for short replies. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: serial-u16550: Check card index validity at probe
serial-u16550 driver blindly trusts that the given devptr->id value is
within the proper card index range at probe. It's OK for the devices
the driver itself creates at the module probe time, but if the device
is bound manually via sysfs interface, this could be -1 as "none", and
this leads to OOB access for index[] and other parameters.
Add a sanity check for the card index and warn/correct it if it's a
value out of the range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: renesas: Fix out-of-bounds access for newdevs mask
When software initiates DAA (Dynamic Address Assignment), the controller
reports the result via the NRSPQP (Normal Response Queue Port Register).
The data length field of the response descriptor, which is accessible
through the NRSPQP register, indicates the number of devices remaining
after DAA. Consequently, when the bus is empty, this field contains the
maximum number of devices supported by the controller (8 for the Renesas
I3C controller).
Adjust the condition that computes the newly discovered devices bitmask
to prevent an out-of-bounds when the I3C bus is empty. |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. OpenEXR versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.10, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 are vulnerable on ILP32 builds to a heap out-of-bounds read. The issue occurs when a crafted RLE-compressed EXR causes the 64-bit unpacked size to truncate before allocation in OpenEXRCore decoding.c and unpack_32bit() reads beyond the resulting buffer, allowing denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mfd: cs42l43: Sanity check firmware size
Currently the code checks if a firmware was received, however it does
not verify that the firmware size is larger than the firmware header. As
the firmware pointer is dereferenced as a pointer to the header
structure this could lead to an out of bounds memory access. Add the
missing check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/percpu-km: fix bitmap overflow and accounting in pcpu_create_chunk()
In pcpu_create_chunk(), nr_pages is the total contiguous backing
allocation, i.e., nr_units * pcpu_unit_pages, but pcpu_chunk_populated()
uses it to set chunk->populated, whose size is pcpu_unit_pages, bitmap.
Since bit N in chunk->populated means page offset N inside every unit is
backed. When nr_units > 1, the function writes beyond chunk->populated.
Fix it by using chunk->nr_pages.
It also fixes the global pcpu_nr_empty_pop_pages accounting, since
pcpu_balance_free() only iterates up to chunk->nr_pages.
Commit a63d4ac4ab609 ("percpu: make percpu-km set chunk->populated bitmap
properly") introduced the bitmap overflow issue. Later, commit
b539b87fed37f ("percpu: implmeent pcpu_nr_empty_pop_pages and
chunk->nr_populated") added pcpu_nr_empty_pop_pages and caused the
accounting issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/test: Fix __fortify_panic
Fix a runtime assertion in setup_xor_mapping(). Fortify complains that it
is potentially overflowing the xormaps array per __counted_by(nr_maps).
Quiet the false positive by initializing @nr_maps earlier.
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 32 byte write of buffer size 0
WARNING: lib/string_helpers.c:1036 at __fortify_report+0x4d/0xa0, CPU#8: modprobe/2728
Call Trace:
__fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
setup_xor_mapping+0x6c/0xa0 [cxl_translate]
[ dj: Fixed up @nr_entries to @nr_maps in commit log. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-qpic-snand: write the feature value before executing SET_FEATURE
qcom_spi_send_cmdaddr() programs NAND_FLASH_CMD/NAND_EXEC_CMD and submits
the descriptors, which makes the controller execute the command
immediately. For SPINAND_SET_FEATURE the value to be written is only
placed into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES afterwards, by qcom_spi_io_op(), in a
second submission - so the chip is programmed with whatever that register
happened to hold from a previous operation, and the intended value is only
applied by the *next* SET_FEATURE.
Measured on a TP-Link Archer AX55 v1 (IPQ5018, ESMT F50L1G41LB): writing
0x40 to the configuration register (0xb0) leaves the chip at 0x00, and the
subsequent write of 0x00 leaves it at 0x40 - every write lands one
operation late.
This stayed unnoticed until v6.18 added SPI-NAND OTP support together
with OTP entries for ESMT chips. spinand_otp_rw() enables OTP mode,
reads, and disables it again, and mtd_otp_nvmem_add() does this during
MTD registration. With the off-by-one, the "disable" write actually
applies the previously requested value, so CFG_OTP_ENABLE ends up set:
the chip stays in OTP mode, every subsequent array read returns the OTP
area instead of the array (UBI reports an empty device) and all writes
fail with -EIO because the OTP area is write protected. On this board
that makes the whole flash unusable and the device unbootable.
Write the feature value into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES as part of the same
transaction, before NAND_EXEC_CMD. While at it, copy only the bytes the
operation actually carries - the previous code dereferenced a 4-byte
pointer on a one-byte buffer (spinand->scratchbuf).
With this patch the flash contents read back bit-identical to a
known-good dump of the same board taken under the vendor firmware
(md5-verified across partitions), and writes work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries: papr-phy-attest - validate cmd.length, plug mem leak
In papr_phy_attest_create_handle(), the params->cmd.length is not
validated before use, which can result in a buffer overlow. Check it and
return -EINVAL if it is either 0 or exceeds sizeof(params->cmd).
Also, params is freed on the success path but not error. Free it on
errors after memory allocation. And free it on negative fd. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - zero report size on F54 work error
In rmi_f54_work(), if an error occurs during report request or command
verification, the code jumped directly to the 'error' label, bypassing
the 'abort' label where f54->report_size was normally zeroed out.
This left f54->report_size containing its previous successful payload
size. If a user then altered the V4L2 format to a smaller size, and a
subsequent run failed, rmi_f54_buffer_queue() would copy the stale,
larger payload size into the shrunken V4L2 buffer, causing a heap
buffer overflow.
Fix this by merging the 'abort' and 'error' labels into a single 'out'
exit path, and ensuring that f54->report_size is always set to 0 on
failure by checking for error and zeroing the local report_size first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: misc: usbio: check ibuf_len against rxbuf_len in bulk msg
ibuf_len is the bulk IN (receive) buffer size, but the EMSGSIZE check
in usbio_bulk_msg() compares it against txbuf_len — the bulk OUT
endpoint size. Both are taken independently from different endpoints
in usbio_probe(), so the check is wrong when they differ.
Use rxbuf_len for the IN direction. This matches the buffer that
actually holds the response data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fpga: dfl: add bounds check in dfh_get_param_size()
dfh_get_param_size() can return a parameter size larger than the feature
region because the loop bounds check is evaluated before incrementing
size. If the EOP (End of Parameters) bit is set in the same iteration,
the inflated size is returned without re-validation against max.
This can cause create_feature_instance() to call memcpy_fromio() with a
size exceeding the ioremap'd region when a malicious FPGA device provides
crafted DFHv1 parameter headers.
Add a bounds check after the size increment to ensure the accumulated
size never exceeds the feature boundary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-control: Fix TOCTOU in sof_ipc4_bytes_put
In sof_ipc4_bytes_put(), the copy size is derived from the old
data->size in the buffer rather than the incoming new data's size
field from ucontrol. If the new data has a different size, the copy
uses the wrong length: it may truncate valid data or copy stale bytes.
Fix by validating and using the incoming data's sof_abi_hdr.size from
ucontrol before copying. |
| Capstone is a disassembly framework. In 6.0.0-Alpha9 and earlier, Capstone's arch/SH/SHDisassembler.c SH floating-point decoders such as opFADD, opFMUL, and opFSUB call set_reg() and set_reg_n() using sh_info.op.op_count without checking the fixed-size operands[] array. Repeated crafted instructions processed through cs_disasm_iter() or cs_disasm() with CS_ARCH_SH, CS_MODE_SH2A or CS_MODE_SH4A, CS_MODE_SHFPU, and CS_OPT_DETAIL can increment the operand count beyond the 176-byte sh_info allocation and perform a four-byte heap buffer overflow write. The corruption can crash the process and may enable code execution depending on heap layout. This issue is fixed in version 6.0.0-Alpha10. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: validate uCAN receive record lengths
pcan_usb_fd_decode_buf() walks uCAN records packed in one USB
receive buffer.
Require each record to contain the fixed header for its type, and verify
CAN payload bytes before copying them into the skb. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP. A remote attacker could exploit this by tricking a user into opening a specially crafted PAA (Paint Shop Pro Array) image file. This vulnerability, a heap-based out-of-bounds write in the decode_lzss() function of the PAA file format plugin, allows data to be written beyond the intended memory buffer. This could lead to heap metadata corruption and potentially enable the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
cca_ecc2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter
block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the
request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the
parameter block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: Validate vmw_surface_metadata::array_size
This field comes from userspace and should be validated against specific
limits depending on which Shader Model (SM) is available. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB read from firmware IE lengths in connect event
The firmware-controlled beacon_ie_len, assoc_req_len, and assoc_resp_len
fields in ath6kl_wmi_connect_event_rx() are not validated against the
buffer length. Their sum (up to 765) can exceed the actual WMI event
data, causing out-of-bounds reads during IE parsing and state corruption
of wmi->is_wmm_enabled.
Add a check that the total IE length fits within the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: enetc: check the number of BDs needed for xdp_frame
The size of xdp_redirect_arr array is ENETC_MAX_SKB_FRAGS. However, the
number of fragments contained in xdp_frame may be greater than or equal
to ENETC_MAX_SKB_FRAGS, which will cause the access to xdp_redirect_arr
to be out of bounds. |
