| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| JavaCV provides Java interfaces to OpenCV, FFmpeg, and other multimedia libraries. Prior to 1.5.14, IPCameraFrameGrabber doubles a 32-bit buffer capacity without checking for overflow or bounding the parsed Content-Length. An application consumes an MJPEG response from a malicious camera endpoint or a tampered plaintext stream. The source can return an oversized Content-Length header in an MJPEG stream. Successful exploitation can trap the frame-grabbing thread in a permanent CPU-spinning loop and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.14. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows USB Video Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows Raw Image Extension allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| A flaw was found in spice-server. The GLZ encoder dictionary restore path truncates a size_t allocation size to int when calling the malloc callback, allowing a malicious authenticated SPICE client during VM live migration to trigger a massive heap buffer overflow by sending a crafted max_encoders value in migration data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpu: host1x: Fix iommu_map_sgtable() return value check
Commit "iommu: return full error code from iommu_map_sg[_atomic]()"
changed iommu_map_sgtable() to return an ssize_t and negative values
in error cases, rather than a size_t and a zero.
pin_job() also was incorrectly assigning to 'int', which could cause
overflows into negative values.
Update pin_job() to correctly check for errors from iommu_map_sgtable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: bpf: Fix hid_bpf_get_data() range check
hid_bpf_get_data() returns a pointer into the HID-BPF context data when
the caller-provided offset and size fit inside ctx->allocated_size.
The current check adds rdwr_buf_size and offset before comparing the
result against ctx->allocated_size. Since both values are unsigned, a
very large size can wrap the sum below ctx->allocated_size and make the
helper return a pointer even though the requested range is not contained
in the backing buffer.
Use check_add_overflow() to reject wrapped range ends before comparing
the requested range end against ctx->allocated_size. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer wraparound in psqlODBC SQLBindParameter allows an application, or an attacker who controls how many parameters the application binds on one statement, to corrupt heap memory. psqlODBC stores the binding count in a signed 16-bit field. Binding parameter number 32768 wraps that count to -32768. Binding parameter 32769 then writes about 2.5 MB of zeros starting 1.25 MB before the binding array, which crashes the application or leaves it running on a corrupted heap. Applications that build parameter lists from untrusted input, such as an IN (?, ?, ...) list, are exposed. Versions before psqlODBC 18.00.0005 are affected. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| A flaw was found in Cockpit. An authenticated local user with a large user identifier (UID) can cause unauthorized modification and disclosure of login records. On 32-bit systems, an integer overflow during session accounting allows the user's login process to read or overwrite the legacy log entries of other accounts. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows Spaceport.sys allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-log: fix a bitset_size overflow on 32bit machines
Commit c20e36b7631d ("dm log: fix out-of-bounds write due to
region_count overflow") made sure that region_count could fit in an
unsigned int. But the bitmap memory isn't allocated based on
region_count. It uses bitset_size (a size_t variable). The first step of
calculating bitset_size is to set it to region_count, rounded up to a
multiple of BITS_PER_LONG. If region_size is less than BITS_PER_LONG
smaller than UINT_MAX, it will get rounded up to 2^32. On a 32bit
architecture, this will make bitset_size wrap around to 0 and fail,
despite region_count being valid.
Since bitset_size gets divided by 8, it can hold any valid region_count.
It just needs a special case to handle the rollover. If it is 0, the
value rolled over, and bitset size should be set to the number of bytes
needed to hold 2^32 bits. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: bound TCP reordering sysctl writes and MTU probe sizes
Reject invalid `net.ipv4.tcp_reordering` values before they reach TCP
socket state. The sysctl is stored as an `int` but copied into the
`u32` `tp->reordering` field for new sockets, so negative writes wrap
to large values.
With `tcp_mtu_probing=2`, the wrapped value can overflow the
`tcp_mtu_probe()` size calculation and drive the MTU probing path into
an out-of-bounds read. Route `tcp_reordering` writes through
`proc_dointvec_minmax()` and require it to be at least 1. Also require
`tcp_max_reordering` to be at least 1 so the configured maximum cannot
become negative either.
When registering the table for a non-init network namespace, relocate
`extra2` pointers that refer into `init_net.ipv4` so the
`tcp_reordering` upper bound follows that namespace's
`tcp_max_reordering`.
Harden `tcp_mtu_probe()` itself by computing `size_needed` as `u64`.
This keeps the send queue and window checks from being bypassed through
signed integer overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ecc - Fix carry overflow in vli multiplication
The carry flag calculation fails when r01.m_high is saturated
(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) and addition of lower bits overflows.
The condition (r01.m_high < product.m_high) doesn't handle the case
where r01.m_high == product.m_high and an additional carry exists
from lower-bit overflow.
When commit 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
introduced crypto/ecc.c, it split the muladd() function in the
micro-ecc library into separate mul_64_64() and add_128_128() helpers.
It seems the check got lost in translation.
Add proper handling for this boundary by accounting for the carry
from the lower addition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress()
ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes:
outhdr->hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) >> 3);
hdrlen is __u8. For n >= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently
truncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16):
(128 * 16) >> 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8
The caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header
at buf + ((ohdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8,
but the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header
plus 128 full addresses). The compressed header overlaps the
decompressed data, and ipv6_rpl_srh_compress() writes into this
overlap, corrupting the routing header of the forwarded packet.
The existing guard at exthdrs.c:546 checks (n + 1) > 255, which
prevents n+1 from overflowing unsigned char (the segments_left
field), but does not prevent the computed hdrlen from overflowing
__u8. n=127 passes because 128 <= 255, yet hdrlen=256 does not
fit.
Tighten the bound to (n + 1) > 127. This caps n at 126, giving
hdrlen = (127 * 16) >> 3 = 254, which fits in __u8. The compressed
header then lands at buf + ((254 + 1) << 3) = buf + 2040, exactly
past the decompressed region (buf[0..2039]). No overlap. 127
segments is well beyond any realistic RPL deployment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
that can be triggered by a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY. In
ceph_handle_auth_reply(), the value of the payload_len field of such a
message is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than
INT_MAX leads to an integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative
value. This leads to decrementing the pointer address by this value and
subsequently accessing it because ceph_decode_need() only checks that
the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the data type of payload_len to
u32. Additionally, the data type of result_msg_len is changed to u32,
as it is also a variable holding a non-negative length.
Also, an additional layer of sanity checks is introduced, ensuring that
directly after reading it from the message, payload_len and
result_msg_len are not greater than the overall segment length.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811404df14 by task kworker/20:1/262
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 262 Comm: kworker/20:1 Not tainted 6.19.2 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
print_report+0xd1/0x620
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x210
kasan_report+0xe7/0x130
? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
__asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20
ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
mon_dispatch+0x973/0x23d0 [libceph]
? apparmor_socket_recvmsg+0x6b/0xa0
? __pfx_mon_dispatch+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30i
? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0
? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
ceph_con_process_message+0x1f1/0x650 [libceph]
process_message+0x1e/0x450 [libceph]
ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x2e48/0x6c80 [libceph]
? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0xb0/0x230
? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x17/0xa0
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x13b/0x760
? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
ceph_con_workfn+0x248/0x10c0 [libceph]
process_one_work+0x629/0xf80
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10
? kasan_print_address_stack_frame+0x1f7/0x280
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x396/0x830
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
? recalc_sigpending+0x180/0x210
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x3f7/0x610
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
[ idryomov: replace if statements with ceph_decode_need() for
payload_len and result_msg_len ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix potential overflow of shmem scatterlist length
When a scatterlists table of a GEM shmem object of size 4 GB or more is
populated with pages allocated from a folio, unsigned int .length
attribute of a scatterlist may get overflowed if total byte length of
pages allocated to that single scatterlist happens to reach or cross the
4GB limit. As a consequence, users of the object may suffer from hitting
unexpected, premature end of the object's backing pages.
[278.780187] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[278.780377] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2326 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_mm.c:55 remap_sg+0x199/0x1d0 [i915]
...
[278.780654] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2326 Comm: gem_mmap_offset Tainted: G S U 6.17.0-rc1-CI_DRM_16981-ged823aaa0607+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[278.780656] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER
[278.780658] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Meteor Lake Client Platform/MTL-P LP5x T3 RVP, BIOS MTLPFWI1.R00.3471.D91.2401310918 01/31/2024
[278.780659] RIP: 0010:remap_sg+0x199/0x1d0 [i915]
...
[278.780786] Call Trace:
[278.780787] <TASK>
[278.780788] ? __apply_to_page_range+0x3e6/0x910
[278.780795] ? __pfx_remap_sg+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[278.780906] apply_to_page_range+0x14/0x30
[278.780908] remap_io_sg+0x14d/0x260 [i915]
[278.781013] vm_fault_cpu+0xd2/0x330 [i915]
[278.781137] __do_fault+0x3a/0x1b0
[278.781140] do_fault+0x322/0x640
[278.781143] __handle_mm_fault+0x938/0xfd0
[278.781150] handle_mm_fault+0x12c/0x300
[278.781152] ? lock_mm_and_find_vma+0x4b/0x760
[278.781155] do_user_addr_fault+0x2d6/0x8e0
[278.781160] exc_page_fault+0x96/0x2c0
[278.781165] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
...
That issue was apprehended by the author of a change that introduced it,
and potential risk even annotated with a comment, but then never addressed.
When adding folio pages to a scatterlist table, take care of byte length
of any single scatterlist not exceeding max_segment.
(cherry picked from commit 06249b4e691a75694c014a61708c007fb5755f60) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/ipv6: ioam6: prevent schema length wraparound in trace fill
ioam6_fill_trace_data() stores the schema contribution to the trace
length in a u8. With bit 22 enabled and the largest schema payload,
sclen becomes 1 + 1020 / 4, wraps from 256 to 0, and bypasses the
remaining-space check. __ioam6_fill_trace_data() then positions the
write cursor without reserving the schema area but still copies the
4-byte schema header and the full schema payload, overrunning the trace
buffer.
Keep sclen in an unsigned int so the remaining-space check and the write
cursor calculation both see the full schema length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: delete attr leaf freemap entries when empty
Back in commit 2a2b5932db6758 ("xfs: fix attr leaf header freemap.size
underflow"), Brian Foster observed that it's possible for a small
freemap at the end of the end of the xattr entries array to experience
a size underflow when subtracting the space consumed by an expansion of
the entries array. There are only three freemap entries, which means
that it is not a complete index of all free space in the leaf block.
This code can leave behind a zero-length freemap entry with a nonzero
base. Subsequent setxattr operations can increase the base up to the
point that it overlaps with another freemap entry. This isn't in and of
itself a problem because the code in _leaf_add that finds free space
ignores any freemap entry with zero size.
However, there's another bug in the freemap update code in _leaf_add,
which is that it fails to update a freemap entry that begins midway
through the xattr entry that was just appended to the array. That can
result in the freemap containing two entries with the same base but
different sizes (0 for the "pushed-up" entry, nonzero for the entry
that's actually tracking free space). A subsequent _leaf_add can then
allocate xattr namevalue entries on top of the entries array, leading to
data loss. But fixing that is for later.
For now, eliminate the possibility of confusion by zeroing out the base
of any freemap entry that has zero size. Because the freemap is not
intended to be a complete index of free space, a subsequent failure to
find any free space for a new xattr will trigger block compaction, which
regenerates the freemap.
It looks like this bug has been in the codebase for quite a long time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: handle wraparound when searching for blocks for indirect mapped blocks
Commit 4865c768b563 ("ext4: always allocate blocks only from groups
inode can use") restricts what blocks will be allocated for indirect
block based files to block numbers that fit within 32-bit block
numbers.
However, when using a review bot running on the latest Gemini LLM to
check this commit when backporting into an LTS based kernel, it raised
this concern:
If ac->ac_g_ex.fe_group is >= ngroups (for instance, if the goal
group was populated via stream allocation from s_mb_last_groups),
then start will be >= ngroups.
Does this allow allocating blocks beyond the 32-bit limit for
indirect block mapped files? The commit message mentions that
ext4_mb_scan_groups_linear() takes care to not select unsupported
groups. However, its loop uses group = *start, and the very first
iteration will call ext4_mb_scan_group() with this unsupported
group because next_linear_group() is only called at the end of the
iteration.
After reviewing the code paths involved and considering the LLM
review, I determined that this can happen when there is a file system
where some files/directories are extent-mapped and others are
indirect-block mapped. To address this, add a safety clamp in
ext4_mb_scan_groups(). |
