| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In Bluetooth Mesh SDK 6.1.4 and earlier, malformed extended advertisements can trigger out-of-bounds writes leading to stack corruption and remote code execution. These messages must come from a device that has already joined the network. Only provisioners supporting extended advertisements may be impacted. |
| An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::MessageEncoder wrote a DNS label's length into a single octet without checking its range. A label longer than 255 octets had its length stored modulo 256 but the label data was written unchanged, and thus the bytes on the wire described a different name than the one the application asked to encode. RFC 1035 section 2.3.4 limits a label to 63 octets, and the two high bits of the length octet are reserved for compression pointers. put_string packed the length with put_pack("C", d.length) and put_label used it for labels, and thus any value from 0 to 255 could end up as a label length octet, including the reserved 0x40-0xBF range and the 0xC0-0xFF pointer range. Resolv::DNS::Name.create did not check per-label or total name length either, and thus an attacker-controlled hostname reached the encoder unchanged. An application that resolves an attacker-controlled hostname sends a query whose wire bytes name a domain the attacker chose. A hostname suffix that the application validates against an allowlist becomes padding that never appears on the wire, and thus allowlist and egress checks can be bypassed. The recursive resolver caches the response under the attacker's name, and DNS logs record that name rather than the one the application asked for. A label length whose low octet lands in the 0xC0-0xFF range produces a length octet that conforming parsers read as the start of a compression pointer, with the following attacker-controlled byte as the offset. |
| An out-of-bounds read was found in the DHCPv4 packet capture code of wicked. ni_capture_inspect_udp_header() in src/capture.c reports the IP total length as the payload length instead of the length of the remaining UDP payload. Consequently, the DHCP option walker in the DHCPv4 client (wickedd-dhcp4) reads up to ihl + 8 bytes — at most 68 bytes — past the end of the 1500-byte packet receive buffer. An unauthenticated attacker on the same network who sends a crafted DHCP/UDP packet can make the client parse adjacent heap memory as DHCP options, so that heap contents such as allocator metadata or pointer values can be interpreted into lease fields. The over-read is bounded to 68 bytes; no memory write, no attacker control over the adjacent bytes and no remote exfiltration primitive has been demonstrated. This issue affects wicked up to and including version 0.6.80. |
| No cwe for this issue in AMD Zen allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| No cwe for this issue in AMD Zen allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| HAProxy Community Edition 3.0 through 3.3 before 3.3.3 lacks a length check for the NEW_TOKEN format. HAProxy Enterprise and ALOHA are also affected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: spi-nor: swp: Improve locking user experience
In the case of the first block being locked (or the few first blocks),
if the user want to fully unlock the device it has two possibilities:
- either it asks to unlock the entire device, and this works;
- or it asks to unlock just the block(s) that are currently locked,
which fails.
It fails because the conditions "can_be_top" and "can_be_bottom" are
true. Indeed, in this case, we unlock everything, so the TB bit does not
matter. However in the current implementation, use_top would be true (as
this is the favourite option) and lock_len, which in practice should be
reduced down to 0, is set to "nor->params->size - (ofs + len)" which is
a positive number. This is wrong.
An easy way is to simply add an extra condition. In the unlock() path,
if we can achieve the same result from both sides, it means we unlock
everything and lock_len must simply be 0. A comment is added to clarify
that logic. |
| Neo4j's Bolt modern handshake decoder treats an overlong capability bit mask the same way it treats a truncated bit mask. When an unauthenticated client sends a selected protocol version followed by 32 continuation bytes in the capability mask, the decoder resets the reader index and waits for more bytes instead of rejecting the protocol message and closing the channel.
Because the same unread bytes remain at the front of the decoder buffer, appending a terminating byte later does not recover the connection. The decoder re-reads the same first 32 continuation bytes, returns without producing a handshake-finalization message, and leaves the channel open.
This can be triggered before authentication by any client that can reach the Bolt connector. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: validate frame length in bcm_rx_setup() for RTR replies
bcm_tx_setup() validates cf->len against the CAN/CAN FD DLC limits
before installing frames for TX_SETUP, but bcm_rx_setup() never did
the same for the RTR-reply frame configured via RX_SETUP with
RX_RTR_FRAME. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: grow index root value before reparent header update
ntfs_ir_reparent() moves the resident index root entries into an index
block and leaves a small root stub containing the child VCN. That root
stub can be larger than the existing resident value. For example, an
empty root with value_length 48 has an index area of 32 bytes, while the
large-index root stub needs index_length and allocated_size of 40 bytes.
The current code publishes the larger index.index_length and
index.allocated_size before resizing the resident value. If the resize
returns -ENOSPC, the recovery path can call ntfs_inode_add_attrlist(),
which looks attributes up again while the root header says
allocated_size 40 but the resident value still only provides 32 bytes of
index area. Lookup-time $INDEX_ROOT validation then correctly rejects
that transient layout as corrupt.
This reproduces as a generic/013 failure under qemu. In the failing run,
the transient root had value_len=48, index_size=32, index_length=40, and
allocated_size=40, and ntfsprogs-plus ntfsck reported "Corrupt index
root in MFT record 1177".
When the root stub grows, resize the resident value before publishing the
larger root header. If the resize fails, the old root remains valid for
recovery lookups. Keep the existing header-before-resize ordering for
shrink or same-size cases so the resident value never temporarily
exposes an allocated_size beyond its bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ieee80211: validate MLE common info length
ieee80211_mle_common_size() uses the first common-info octet as the
common information length for all known MLE types. However,
ieee80211_mle_size_ok() only validates that octet for Basic, Probe
Request, and TDLS MLEs.
Reconfiguration MLEs also skipped the length octet when calculating the
minimum common size, and Priority Access MLEs skipped validation of the
advertised common information length.
Account for the Reconfiguration common-info length octet and validate
the advertised common information length for all known MLE types. Keep
unknown-type handling unchanged.
[remove now misleading comment] |
| Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.16, _read_character_string and _read_string in src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py advanced self.offset by attacker-declared RDLENGTH without checking it against self._data_len, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to send a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record with rdlength=65535 and seed DNSCache and ServiceInfo.properties with truncated, attacker-shaped key/value or address records. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.16. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject overlapping data areas in SMB2 responses
Commit 53b7c271f06b ("smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to
responses without data area") restricted the implied bcc[0] length
exception to responses without a data area. However, the overlap
handling in __smb2_calc_size() clears data_length, which can make an
invalid response appear to have no data area and so qualify for the
exception.
Track data area overlap separately and reject such responses before
applying the length compatibility exceptions. |
| Side-channel information leakage in GPU in Google Chrome on Android prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| axios versions >=1.13.0 (Node.js HTTP adapter) fail to enforce the configured maxBodyLength limit on streamed request bodies when requests are sent with httpVersion: 2. Because Node's HTTP/2 request API does not honor the maxBodyLength option and axios's byte-counting stream wrapper is gated on maxRedirects === 0, an attacker who controls a stream passed to axios can cause the application to transmit outbound data exceeding the configured finite maxBodyLength. Impact is limited to resource consumption and policy bypass (excess egress, upstream quota consumption, limited availability); it does not enable code execution, credential disclosure, or request-destination control. Calls using the default maxBodyLength: -1 and browser adapters are not affected. |
| FreeRDP before 3.29.0 contains a buffer over-disclosure vulnerability in the gateway WebSocket transport (libfreerdp/core/gateway/websocket.c). The client's Pong reply reuses a fixed 1024-byte response stream whose length is not sealed to the actual received Ping payload, so a malicious gateway/WebSocket peer sending a non-empty Ping control frame causes the client to reply with an overlong Pong that discloses bytes beyond the received payload (the peer receives the masking key and can unmask the reply). A zero-length Ping reaches an assertion and terminates the client (denial of service). |
| Side-channel information leakage in WebAudio in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Side-channel information leakage in Safe Browsing in Google Chrome on iOS prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Side-channel information leakage in ComputePressure in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency (CWE-130) vulnerability exists in TTSSH2 plugin of Tera Term provided by TeraTerm Project. When Tera Term attempts to establish an SSH connection to a server set up by an attacker, out-of-bounds read/write may occur. As a result, the contents of adjacent memory regions may be transmitted to the server, and Tera Term may behave unexpected or terminate abnormally. |
