| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: use fsdata to track inline data write state and fix race
Instead of checking the live inode state (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)
and ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)) in the
write_end handlers, use the fsdata parameter of the address space
operations to explicitly pass down the state in which write_begin
prepared the write.
A concurrent thread (such as ext4_page_mkwrite()) can convert the
inline data to an extent between write_begin and write_end. If this
happens, the write_end handlers would previously miss the inline
write_end path and fall through to extent-based write_end logic.
However, since block buffers were never allocated in write_begin,
this resulted in NULL pointer dereferences or data loss because
folio_buffers(folio) was NULL.
Define EXT4_WRITE_DATA_INLINE (4) as a bit flag (Bit 2), treating
fsdata as bitwise flags rather than mutually exclusive enums to keep
states of the write path independent. Communicate this state via
fsdata:
1) ext4_write_begin() and ext4_da_write_begin() set the
EXT4_WRITE_DATA_INLINE bit in *fsdata via bitwise OR when an inline
write is successfully prepared.
2) On entry, ext4_write_begin() clears the EXT4_WRITE_DATA_INLINE bit
to safely handle VFS retries (where generic_perform_write() bypasses
the fsdata initialization on its retry jump).
3) The write_end handlers perform a bitwise AND to check if the
EXT4_WRITE_DATA_INLINE bit is set and invoke the inline write_end
helper accordingly.
Furthermore, during a buffered write, ext4_write_inline_data_end()
acquires the xattr lock after preparing the write. If a concurrent
page fault (ext4_page_mkwrite()) converts the inline data to an extent
after the write_end handlers check the state but before
ext4_write_inline_data_end() acquires the xattr write lock, the
subsequent check will trigger a kernel panic via
BUG_ON(!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)).
To keep git history working and bisectability clean, replace the
BUG_ON check in ext4_write_inline_data_end() with a graceful error-
handling retry path in this same commit. If the inline data is cleared
after locking the xattr, we safely release all resources (releasing
iloc.bh, unlocking/putting the folio, stopping the active journal
transaction handle) and return 0 (VFS retry) to let the generic write
path retry the operation safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: drain in-flight DIO before buffered write fallback
generic/746 started failing intermittently on ext3 (no-extent inodes).
The test triggers 'Page cache invalidation failure on direct I/O'
warnings and subsequent fsync returns -EIO. Adding a 50ms delay
between ext4_buffered_write_iter() and filemap_write_and_wait_range()
in ext4_dio_write_iter() makes the race almost always reproducible.
On no-extent inodes, DIO writes to holes cannot use unwritten extents,
so ext4_iomap_alloc() leaves m_flags=0 and ext4_map_blocks() returns 0.
The iomap layer then returns -ENOTBLK, causing fallback to buffered I/O.
The fallback path in ext4_dio_write_iter() calls
ext4_buffered_write_iter() which dirties pages, then does flush and
invalidate. However, there's an unprotected window between
ext4_buffered_write_iter() returning (with inode lock released) and
the subsequent flush+invalidate.
Concurrent async DIO completions from other threads can run
kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() during this window. If pages have
been re-dirtied, post-invalidation finds dirty pages and triggers the
warning, setting -EIO in the error sequence.
Consider a file with two 4k extents: [hole][written]. Thread A does
DIO to the written extent, while thread B does DIO spanning both:
kworker A (4k DIO, allocated block) kworker B (8k DIO, fallback)
----------------------------------- ----------------------------
inode_lock_shared() inode_lock_shared()
iomap_dio_rw(): iomap_dio_rw():
kiocb_invalidate_pages -> clean iomap_begin -> -ENOTBLK
submit_bio (async) dio->size = 0
inode_unlock_shared() inode_unlock_shared()
[bio pending in block layer] /* fallback: lock released */
ext4_buffered_write_iter()
inode_lock(exclusive)
generic_perform_write()
-> dirty pages [0, 8k]
inode_unlock(exclusive)
/* pages dirty, no lock */
[bio completes] filemap_write_and_wait_range()
iomap_dio_complete() -> flush dirty pages
kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() invalidate_mapping_pages()
invalidate_inode_pages2_range()
-> finds dirty page!
-> dio_warn_stale_pagecache()
-> errseq_set(-EIO)
This issue can be triggered through normal I/O paths, not just
intentionally overlapping DIO writes from userspace. For example,
generic/746 uses a loop device where multiple kworkers issue concurrent
I/O to the backing file. Additionally, when block_size < folio_size,
non-overlapping DIO writes that share a large folio can also trigger
the race.
Add inode_dio_wait() in ext4_buffered_write_iter() before
ext4_write_checks() to drain all in-flight DIO. This ensures that
all DIO clears existing pages before submitting IO (via
kiocb_invalidate_pages()), all BIO waits for all DIO to complete
(via inode_dio_wait()), and ext4_write_checks() observes the inode
size after all completed DIO so that ext4_block_zero_eof() does not
race with in-flight DIO, thus eliminating the race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Drain RCU callbacks during module teardown
devx_free_subscription() can remain queued after the last DevX event file
drops its module reference or an auxiliary driver detaches its devices.
mlx5_ib can then unload before the callback runs.
Registration error unwind has the same risk because driver registration
can attach existing devices before failing. Wait after all drivers have
stopped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell-privacy: Fix race condition
Accessing priv->features_present needs to happen with the list mutex
being held, otherwise priv can be freed at any moment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-apple: Use acquire/release for queue enabled state
apple_nvme_init_queue() initializes queue state and then marks the queue
enabled. The interrupt and request paths check enabled before using that
queue state.
The old wmb() after WRITE_ONCE(enabled, true) does not publish the
earlier initialization before enabled becomes visible. Use a release store
when enabling the queue and acquire loads when testing it.
Although the shutdown-side enabled accesses are not used for publishing
queue initialization, use helpers for them as well for consistency. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix channel idle state management in AXIDMA and MCDMA interrupt handlers
Fix a race condition in AXIDMA and MCDMA irq handlers where the channel
could be incorrectly marked as idle and attempt spurious transfers when
descriptors are still being processed.
The issue occurs when:
1. Multiple descriptors are queued and active.
2. An interrupt fires after completing some descriptors.
3. xilinx_dma_complete_descriptor() moves completed descriptors to
done_list.
4. Channel is marked idle and start_transfer() is called even though
active_list still contains unprocessed descriptors.
5. This leads to premature transfer attempts and potential descriptor
corruption or missed completions.
Only mark the channel as idle and start new transfers when the active list
is actually empty, ensuring proper channel state management and avoiding
spurious transfer attempts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Avoid IDR updates while cleaning channels
scmi_cleanup_channels() walks the TX/RX channel IDRs with
idr_for_each() to free transport resources and destroy the dedicated
transport devices before calling idr_destroy().
The destroy callback removed each entry from the same IDR being walked.
That is not needed for this cleanup path, and it is unsafe because
idr_for_each() has not advanced its radix-tree iterator while the
callback is running. Removing the current entry from the callback can
invalidate the iterator state. The callback also cannot be protected by
rcu_read_lock(), because scmi_device_destroy() may sleep.
Leave IDR teardown to the following idr_destroy() call and keep the
callback limited to device destruction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Associate BOs with every job that accesses them
A submission can expand into a chain of jobs (e.g. bin + render + cache
clean). Implicit synchronization in v3d_submit_lock_reservations() is gated
on each job's bo[], but the BO list was only ever attached to the last job
of the chain. When that last job is a trailing CACHE_CLEAN job, the job
that actually consumes the BOs (that is, a RENDER or CSD job) was left with
bo_count == 0 and picked up no implicit dependencies. It could therefore
be dispatched to the hardware and read a BO while another context was still
writing it, leading to data corruption.
Attach the BOs to the job that consumes them, so (1) it acquires the
correct implicit dependencies during reservation locking and (2) they are
kept mapped until the end of the submission. Give it references to all
consuming job's BOs through v3d_job_reference_bos() instead of looking the
handles up a second time; that avoids a redundant lookup and guarantees
both jobs reference the exact same objects.
As the CACHE_CLEAN job now carries a BO array as well, add a per-job
`has_implicit_dep` flag so that only the consuming jobs take implicit
dependencies. The CACHE_CLEAN job (a global flush) and the BIN job (binning
waiting on another context is not a realistic scenario) are excluded. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dax: read holder_ops once in dax_holder_notify_failure()
dax_holder_notify_failure() reads dax_dev->holder_ops twice without
READ_ONCE() -- once for the NULL check and once for the indirect
notify_failure() call. A concurrent fs_put_dax() can clear holder_ops
between the two reads, so the check can observe a non-NULL pointer while
the call dereferences NULL. (kill_dax() also clears holder_ops, but only
after synchronize_srcu(), so it cannot race a reader that is inside
dax_read_lock(); fs_put_dax() does no such synchronization.)
Fetch holder_ops once into a local with READ_ONCE() so the NULL check and
the indirect call observe the same value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix requested device removal race
scmi_protocol_device_unrequest() drops scmi_requested_devices_mtx while
notifying listeners but continues to retain the per-protocol list head.
When two SCMI drivers for the same protocol unregister concurrently, one
thread can remove the final request and free the list head while the other
is running its notifier. The latter then dereferences the freed list head
after reacquiring the mutex and can free it a second time.
Complete the list and IDR updates, including freeing an empty list head,
before dropping the mutex. Keep the blocking notifier outside the critical
section and retain only the detached request across the callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping
When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered
write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new
valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be
overwritten.
Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop ->map_pages so that every first
write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to
cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a
writable PTE, skip ->page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without
advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves
never-written pages in a large mapping alone.
The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate
blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping.
On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is
unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode
lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers
it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: scope memalloc_noio to allocation critical sections
Storing a memalloc_noio_save() token in mddev->noio_flags lets one task
save the token and another task restore it. With concurrent suspend sysfs
writes, task A can enter PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO, return to userspace still in
that scope, and later task B can restore A's saved token.
Avoid tying the token lifetime to mddev. Keep mddev_suspend() and
mddev_resume() only responsible for array suspension, and enter
PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO only in the MD paths that allocate memory after the array
has been suspended. Restore the token before resuming the array.
A reproducer repeatedly writes suspend_lo and suspend_hi from concurrent
workers and checks each worker's /proc/self/stat flags before and after the
sysfs write. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Remove redundant VPD flash read in sysfs read path
qla2x00_sysfs_read_vpd() called ha->isp_ops->read_optrom() a second time
after releasing optrom_mutex. The repeated read is redundant and, unlike
the first, runs without optrom_mutex held, exposing flash access to
concurrent optrom operations. Drop the duplicate call. |
| On affected platforms running Arista EOS, when multiple gRPC Network Security Interface (gNSI) transports are configured, a race condition in the gNSI Authz service may cause a policy rotation to fail silently. An authenticated user whose access was revoked by the new policy may retain unauthorized access to gRPC interfaces. This does not affect Bootz.
This issue was discovered internally by Arista, and the company is not aware of any malicious exploitation of this vulnerability in customer networks. |
| A race condition was addressed with improved state handling. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7 and iPadOS 26.7, iOS 27 and iPadOS 27, macOS Golden Gate 27, macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.7, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. |
| Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier (and develop pre-release commits prior to the fix) contain a race condition in the asset checkout paths. Api\AssetsController::checkout() and Assets\AssetCheckoutController::store() call Asset::availableForCheckout() outside the mutation path and then invoke Asset::checkOut() without taking a row lock or re-checking availability, so two concurrent checkout requests for the same available asset can both observe it as available and both commit. This produces duplicate checkout-history rows, a doubled checkout_counter, and two CheckoutableCheckedOut events for a single-assignment asset, corrupting the audit trail and utilization/reconciliation reporting; the asset's final assigned_to remains singular, so the visible assignment stays intact. Exploitation requires an authenticated session holding the assets.checkout permission (or superuser) and precise concurrent timing. Fixed in 8.7.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: fix race between partial drm_dev_register() failure and ioctl
If drm_dev_register() fails after registering a minor (e.g. render minor
registered, primary minor fails), userspace could have opened the first
minor and entered a drm_dev_enter() critical section. Since the
unplugged flag was never set, the ioctl proceeds while the error path
tears down device resources.
Fix this by introducing drm_dev_synchronize_unplug(), which sets the
unplugged flag and waits for the SRCU barrier, ensuring all in-flight
drm_dev_enter() critical sections complete before cleanup proceeds; call
it on the error path of drm_dev_register(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix folio_nr_pages() race after put in large folio invalidate
Our v6.18 based Android system is continuely suffering livelock and bad
page stat as shown in[1] which related to broken xarray slot status. By
investigating big folio operations within f2fs, we find below races and
fix it by get the nr_pages before drop the refcount and folio_lock.
f2fs_get_read_data_folio() calls f2fs_folio_put() before
folio_nr_pages() when invalidating a large folio from the page cache.
That unlocks the folio and drops the caller reference, leaving a window
where a concurrent truncate or folio split can shrink the compound folio
or free it before the invalidate range is computed. An undersized range
then leaves split sub-folios in mapping->i_pages, which can later
interact badly with truncate and reclaim (stale xarray entries and bad
page state when folio->mapping no longer matches the mapping being
truncated).
[1]
PID: 2594 TASK: ffffff8169b81580 CPU: 7 COMMAND: "Thread-3"
#0 [ffffffc08ef2b8a0] xas_load at ffffffe52d1f42a4
#1 [ffffffc08ef2b900] find_get_entries at ffffffe52c185798
#2 [ffffffc08ef2bb60] truncate_inode_pages_range at ffffffe52c19e83c
#3 [ffffffc08ef2bbc0] truncate_inode_pages_final at ffffffe52c19ec2c
#4 [ffffffc08ef2bc20] f2fs_evict_inode at ffffffe52c4c8400
#5 [ffffffc08ef2bcc0] evict at ffffffe52c2de9f4
#6 [ffffffc08ef2bd00] iput at ffffffe52c2db1b4
#7 [ffffffc08ef2bd30] dentry_unlink_inode at ffffffe52c2d7204
#8 [ffffffc08ef2bd50] __dentry_kill at ffffffe52c2d3dcc
#9 [ffffffc08ef2bd80] dput at ffffffe52c2d3c3c
#10 [ffffffc08ef2bda0] __fput at ffffffe52c2b0a7c
#11 [ffffffc08ef2bde0] ____fput at ffffffe52c2b1034
#12 [ffffffc08ef2bdf0] task_work_run at ffffffe52beea200
#13 [ffffffc08ef2be20] exit_to_user_mode_loop at ffffffe52bfbc17c
#14 [ffffffc08ef2be80] el0_svc at ffffffe52d1f8e54
#15 [ffffffc08ef2beb0] el0t_64_sync_handler at ffffffe52d1f8d10 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Hold vport_slock for host map update in report ID acquisition
qla24xx_report_id_acquisition() format-1 handling drops vport_slock after
taking the vport reference and then calls qla_update_host_map() without
the lock. That reaches qla_update_vp_map(), which mutates the ha->host_map
btree via btree_insert32()/btree_update32()/btree_remove32() and is
documented to require vport_slock to be held by the caller. Running it
unlocked can race concurrent host_map updates and corrupt the btree.
The format-2 path in the same function already wraps its host_map update
(SET_AL_PA) in vport_slock; the format-1 path is the lone outlier.
Hold vport_slock across the format-1 qla_update_host_map() call to honor
the documented locking contract. The vref_count taken in the loop keeps
the vport valid, so this only adds the missing host_map serialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Hold qpair lock when sending NVMe LS reject
qla_nvme_ls_reject_iocb() allocates from and advances the request ring
through __qla2x00_alloc_iocbs() (which assumes the hardware_lock is
held) and qla2x00_start_iocbs() (which advances the ring and rings the
request-in doorbell), but takes no lock itself. Two of its callers
invoke it without the producer lock held:
- qla_nvme_xmt_ls_rsp(), the NVMe-FC .xmt_ls_rsp transport callback, on
its error path, and
- qla2xxx_process_purls_pkt(), run from the purex work/DPC context.
Both use ha->base_qpair, whose qp_lock_ptr is hardware_lock, so they can
run concurrently with normal I/O submission on the base ring and corrupt
the ring producer state, leading to duplicated or dropped commands. The
third caller, qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb(), runs inside
qla24xx_process_response_queue() with the qpair lock already held and is
safe; that is also why the lock cannot be taken inside the helper itself
(it would recursively re-acquire hardware_lock on the response path).
Take qp_lock_ptr around the two unlocked callers and document the helper
as caller-locked. Both run in process context, so spin_lock_irqsave() is
used and nothing in the locked region sleeps. |
