| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The implementation of EdDSA in EdDSA-Java (aka ed25519-java) through 0.3.0 exhibits signature malleability and does not satisfy the SUF-CMA (Strong Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attacks) property. This allows attackers to create new valid signatures different from previous signatures for a known message. |
| Under certain circumstances, BIND is too lenient when accepting records from answers, allowing an attacker to inject forged data into the cache.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.16.50, 9.18.0 through 9.18.39, 9.20.0 through 9.20.13, 9.21.0 through 9.21.12, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.16.50-S1, 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.39-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.13-S1. |
| Constellation is the first Confidential Kubernetes. The Constellation CVM image uses LUKS2-encrypted volumes for persistent storage. When opening an encrypted storage device, the CVM uses the libcryptsetup function crypt_activate_by_passhrase. If the VM is successful in opening the partition with the disk encryption key, it treats the volume as confidential. However, due to the unsafe handling of null keyslot algorithms in the cryptsetup 2.8.1, it is possible that the opened volume is not encrypted at all. Cryptsetup prior to version 2.8.1 does not report an error when processing LUKS2-formatted disks that use the cipher_null-ecb algorithm in the keyslot encryption field. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.24.0. |
| An improper file signature check in Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR agent may allow an attacker to bypass the Cortex XDR agent's executable blocking capabilities and run untrusted executables on the device. This issue can be leveraged to execute untrusted software without being detected or blocked. |
| OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. |
| xml-crypto is an xml digital signature and encryption library for Node.js. In affected versions the default configuration does not check authorization of the signer, it only checks the validity of the signature per section 3.2.2 of the w3 xmldsig-core-20080610 spec. As such, without additional validation steps, the default configuration allows a malicious actor to re-sign an XML document, place the certificate in a `<KeyInfo />` element, and pass `xml-crypto` default validation checks. As a result `xml-crypto` trusts by default any certificate provided via digitally signed XML document's `<KeyInfo />`. `xml-crypto` prefers to use any certificate provided via digitally signed XML document's `<KeyInfo />` even if library was configured to use specific certificate (`publicCert`) for signature verification purposes. An attacker can spoof signature verification by modifying XML document and replacing existing signature with signature generated with malicious private key (created by attacker) and by attaching that private key's certificate to `<KeyInfo />` element. This vulnerability is combination of changes introduced to `4.0.0` on pull request 301 / commit `c2b83f98` and has been addressed in version 6.0.0 with pull request 445 / commit `21201723d`. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may either check the certificate extracted via `getCertFromKeyInfo` against trusted certificates before accepting the results of the validation or set `xml-crypto's getCertFromKeyInfo` to `() => undefined` forcing `xml-crypto` to use an explicitly configured `publicCert` or `privateKey` for signature verification. |
| rfc3161-client is a Python library implementing the Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP) described in RFC 3161. Prior to version 1.0.3, there is a flaw in the timestamp response signature verification logic. In particular, chain verification is performed against the TSR's embedded certificates up to the trusted root(s), but fails to verify the TSR's own signature against the timestamping leaf certificates. Consequently, vulnerable versions perform insufficient signature validation to properly consider a TSR verified, as the attacker can introduce any TSR signature so long as the embedded leaf chains up to some root TSA. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3. There is no workaround for this issue. |
| Cryptographic validation of upgrade images could be circumventing by dropping a specifically crafted file into the upgrade ISO |
| tiny-secp256k1 is a tiny secp256k1 native/JS wrapper. Prior to version 1.1.7, a malicious JSON-stringifyable message can be made passing on verify(), when global Buffer is the buffer package. This affects only environments where require('buffer') is the NPM buffer package. Buffer.isBuffer check can be bypassed, resulting in strange objects being accepted as a message, and those messages could trick verify() into returning false-positive true values. This issue has been patched in version 1.1.7. |
| Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, Ed25519 signature verification accepts forged non-canonical signatures where the scalar S is not reduced modulo the group order (`S >= L`). A valid signature and its `S + L` variant both verify in forge, while Node.js `crypto.verify` (OpenSSL-backed) rejects the `S + L` variant, as defined by the specification. This class of signature malleability has been exploited in practice to bypass authentication and authorization logic (see CVE-2026-25793, CVE-2022-35961). Applications relying on signature uniqueness (i.e., dedup by signature bytes, replay tracking, signed-object canonicalization checks) may be bypassed. Version 1.4.0 patches the issue. |
| Botan is a C++ cryptography library. From version 3.0.0 to before version 3.11.0, during X509 path validation, OCSP responses were checked for an appropriate status code, but critically omitted verifying the signature of the OCSP response itself. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.0. |
| OneUptime is an open-source monitoring and observability platform. Prior to version 10.0.42, OneUptime's SAML SSO implementation (App/FeatureSet/Identity/Utils/SSO.ts) has decoupled signature verification and identity extraction. isSignatureValid() verifies the first <Signature> element in the XML DOM using xml-crypto, while getEmail() always reads from assertion[0] via xml2js. An attacker can prepend an unsigned assertion containing an arbitrary identity before a legitimately signed assertion, resulting in authentication bypass. This issue has been patched in version 10.0.42. |
| An improper verification of cryptographic signature vulnerability exists in Cortex XSOAR and Cortex XSIAM platforms during integration of Microsoft Teams that enables an unauthenticated user to access and modify protected resources. |
| JetKVM prior to 0.5.4 does not verify the authenticity of downloaded firmware files. An attacker-in-the-middle or a compromised update server could modify the firmware and the corresponding SHA256 hash to pass verification. |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature in Galaxy Store prior to version 4.6.03.8 allows local attacker to install arbitrary application. |
| Akeo Consulting Rufus prior to version 2.17.1187 does not adequately validate the integrity of updates downloaded over HTTP, allowing an attacker to easily convince a user to execute arbitrary code |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By matching a valid transaction's txid while providing invalid authorization data, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This would not allow invalid transactions to be accepted but could result in a consensus split between vulnerable Zebra nodes and invulnerable Zebra and Zcashd nodes. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1. |
| JOSE is a Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) library. Prior to version 0.3.5+1, a vulnerability in jose could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to forge valid JWS/JWT tokens by using a key embedded in the JOSE header (jwk). The vulnerability exists because key selection could treat header-provided jwk as a verification candidate even when that key was not present in the trusted key store. Since JOSE headers are untrusted input, an attacker could exploit this by creating a token payload, embedding an attacker-controlled public key in the header, and signing with the matching private key. Applications using affected versions for token verification are impacted. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.5+1. A workaround for this issue involves rejecting tokens where header jwk is present unless that jwk matches a key already present in the application's trusted key store. |
| An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 3.5.x and 3.6.x through 3.6.5 and TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0. There is a lack of contributory behavior in FFDH due to improper input validation. Using finite-field Diffie-Hellman, the other party can force the shared secret into a small set of values (lack of contributory behavior). This is a problem for protocols that depend on contributory behavior (which is not the case for TLS). The attack can be carried by the peer, or depending on the protocol by an active network attacker (person in the middle). |
| RAUC controls the update process on embedded Linux systems. Prior to version 1.15.2, RAUC bundles using the 'plain' format exceeding a payload size of 2 GiB cause an integer overflow which results in a signature which covers only the first few bytes of the payload. Given such a bundle with a legitimate signature, an attacker can modify the part of the payload which is not covered by the signature. This issue has been patched in version 1.15.2. |
