| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mpls: initialize rtm_tos in mpls_getroute()
mpls_getroute() builds the RTM_NEWROUTE reply to an RTM_GETROUTE
request by filling a struct rtmsg allocated from an skb whose data
area is not zeroed (alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, ...)). It sets every
field of the header except rtm_tos:
r = nlmsg_data(nlh);
r->rtm_family = AF_MPLS;
r->rtm_dst_len = 20;
r->rtm_src_len = 0;
r->rtm_table = RT_TABLE_MAIN;
r->rtm_type = RTN_UNICAST;
r->rtm_scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
r->rtm_protocol = rt->rt_protocol;
r->rtm_flags = 0;
struct rtmsg has no padding, so the one uninitialised byte rtm_tos
(offset 3) is copied straight to user space on recvmsg(), leaking a
byte of uninitialised heap memory. This is in contrast to
mpls_dump_route(), which fills the very same header and does set
rtm_tos = 0.
Initialize rtm_tos to 0, matching mpls_dump_route().
Reproduced with KMSAN by adding an MPLS route and issuing a
non-RTM_F_FIB_MATCH RTM_GETROUTE for its label:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x36c/0x33f0
_copy_to_iter+0x36c/0x33f0
__skb_datagram_iter+0x196/0x12c0
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5b/0x210
netlink_recvmsg+0x37b/0xef0
...
Uninit was created at:
__alloc_skb+0x8ca/0x10e0
mpls_getroute+0x1280/0x3a40
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1138/0x15a0
...
Byte 19 of 64 is uninitialized
(byte 19 = nlmsghdr(16) + rtmsg offset 3 = rtm_tos) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: imx: reconfigure for PIO when DMA cannot be started
When spi_imx_can_dma() selects DMA, the ECSPI is configured for DMA:
spi_imx_setupxfer() sets CTRL.SMC and clears dynamic_burst, and
spi_imx_dma_transfer() programs the dynamic-burst BURST_LENGTH and the
SDMA watermarks.
If the DMA descriptor cannot be prepared (dmaengine_prep_slave_single()
returns NULL), the transfer is failed with SPI_TRANS_FAIL_NO_START and
falls back to PIO. The dynamic-burst DMA path uses its own bounce
buffers instead of the SPI core's mapping, so xfer->{tx,rx}_sg_mapped
are not set and the core's DMA->PIO retry is skipped; the driver falls
back to PIO internally. But none of the DMA-mode configuration is
undone, so the PIO transfer runs with CTRL.SMC set, the wrong burst
length and dynamic_burst cleared, and the transferred data is corrupted.
This is easily hit on i.MX8MP boards that describe ECSPI DMA in the
device tree but run SDMA on ROM firmware (no external sdma-imx7d.bin):
every ECSPI DMA prepare fails. An Infineon SLB9670 TPM on ECSPI1 then
returns shifted TPM2_GetCapability data, is flagged "field failure
mode", /dev/tpmrm0 is never created.
Set controller->fallback before re-running spi_imx_setupxfer() so the
ECSPI is reconfigured exactly like a normal PIO transfer. With
controller->fallback set, spi_imx_setupxfer() sees spi_imx_can_dma()
return false, so it clears spi_imx->usedma and reprograms the controller
(clears CTRL.SMC, restores dynamic_burst and the PIO burst length). No
explicit spi_imx->usedma = false is needed: setupxfer() already updates
it from the can_dma() result. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: vsie: Add missing radix_tree_preload() in _gaccess_shadow_fault()
Add missing radix_tree_preload() in _gaccess_shadow_fault() to
guarantee forward progress. The core of _gaccess_shadow_fault() has
been split into ___gaccess_shadow_fault() in order to simplify locking. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-integrity: fix leaking uninitialized kernel memory
If hash size is less than device's tuple size, dm-integrity is supposed
to zero the remaining space. There was a bug in the code that zeroing
didn't work. This commit fixes it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/waitid: clear waitid info before copying it to userspace
IORING_OP_WAITID stores its result fields in struct io_waitid::info and
later copies them to userspace siginfo. The prep path initializes the
request arguments, but it does not initialize info itself.
If the wait operation completes without reporting a child event, the common
wait code can return without writing wo_info. In that case io_waitid_finish()
still copies iw->info to userspace, exposing stale bytes from the reused
io_kiocb command storage.
Clear the result storage during prep so the io_uring path matches the
regular waitid syscall, which uses a zero-initialized struct waitid_info. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "arm64: zynqmp: Add an OP-TEE node to the device tree"
This reverts commit 06d22ed6b6635b17551f386b50bb5aaff9b75fbe.
OP-TEE logic in U-Boot automatically injects a reserved-memory
node along with optee firmware node to kernel device tree.
The injection logic is dependent on that there is no manually
defined optee node. Having the node in zynqmp.dtsi effectively
breaks OP-TEE's insertion of the reserved-memory node, causing
memory access violations during runtime. |
| sshd in OpenSSH before 10.4 has an undocumented security-relevant behavior: GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck has no value if the server is in Windows Active Directory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: zero per-item info buffer before handing it to visitors
rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() both hand a
caller-allocated on-stack u64 buffer to a per-connection visitor and
then copy the full item_len bytes back to user space via
rds_info_copy() regardless of how much of the buffer the visitor
actually wrote.
rds_ib_conn_info_visitor() and rds6_ib_conn_info_visitor() only
write a subset of their output struct when the underlying
rds_connection is not in state RDS_CONN_UP (src/dst addr, tos, sl
and the two GIDs via explicit memsets). Several u32 fields
(max_send_wr, max_recv_wr, max_send_sge, rdma_mr_max, rdma_mr_size,
cache_allocs) and the 2-byte alignment hole between sl and
cache_allocs remain as whatever stack contents preceded the visitor
call and are then memcpy_to_user()'d out to user space.
struct rds_info_rdma_connection and struct rds6_info_rdma_connection
are the only rds_info_* structs in include/uapi/linux/rds.h that are
not marked __attribute__((packed)), so they have a real alignment
hole. The other info visitors (rds_conn_info_visitor,
rds6_conn_info_visitor, rds_tcp_tc_info, ...) write all fields of
their packed output struct today and are not known to be vulnerable,
but a future visitor that adds a conditional write-path would have
the same bug.
Reproduction on a kernel built without CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y:
a local unprivileged user opens AF_RDS, sets SO_RDS_TRANSPORT=IB,
binds to a local address on an RDMA-capable netdev (rxe soft-RoCE on
any netdev is sufficient), sendto()'s any peer on the same subnet
(fails cleanly but installs an rds_connection in the global hash in
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING), then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS,
RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS). The returned 68-byte item contains 26
bytes of stack garbage including kernel text/data pointers:
0..7 0a 63 00 01 0a 63 00 02 src=10.99.0.1 dst=10.99.0.2
8..39 00 ... gids (memset-zeroed)
40..47 e0 92 a3 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (max_send_wr)
48..55 7f 37 b5 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (rdma_mr_max)
56..59 01 00 08 00 rdma_mr_size (garbage)
60..61 00 00 tos, sl
62..63 00 00 alignment padding
64..67 18 00 00 00 cache_allocs (garbage)
Fix by zeroing the per-item buffer in both rds_for_each_conn_info()
and rds_walk_conn_path_info() before invoking the visitor. This
covers the IPv4/IPv6 IB visitors and hardens all current and future
visitors against the same class of bug.
No functional change for visitors that fully populate their output.
Changes in v2:
- retarget at the net tree (subject prefix "[PATCH net v2]",
net/rds: prefix in the title)
- pick up Reviewed-by tags from Sharath Srinivasan and
Allison Henderson |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm_mpam: Check whether the config array is allocated before destroying it
__destroy_component_cfg() is called to free the configuration array.
It uses the embedded 'garbage' structure, which means the array has
to be allocated.
If __destroy_component_cfg() is called from mpam_disable() before the
configuration was ever allocated, then a NULL pointer is dereferenced.
Check for this case and return early if the configuration is not
allocated.
__destroy_component_cfg() also frees the mbwu_state as this is allocated
by __allocate_component_cfg(). As the mbwu_state is allocated after
comp->cfg is set, and is also under mpam_list_lock, only the first
pointer needs checking. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: fix stack info leak in tap_ioctl() SIOCGIFHWADDR
In the SIOCGIFHWADDR path, tap_ioctl() copies 16 bytes of an
uninitialised on-stack struct sockaddr_storage to userspace via
ifr_hwaddr, but netif_get_mac_address() only writes sa_family and
dev->addr_len (6 for Ethernet) bytes, leaving sa_data[6..13] uninitialised.
Those 8 trailing bytes leak kernel stack contents; SIOCGIFHWADDR on a
macvtap chardev returns kernel .text and direct-map pointers, defeating
KASLR.
Initialise ss at declaration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user()
tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel
without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb()
only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)),
leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack
garbage.
An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with
TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the
partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel
stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet.
Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole
header right after declaration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/cdx: Fix NULL pointer dereference in interrupt trigger path
Add validation to ensure MSI is configured before accessing cdx_irqs
array in vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(). Without this check, userspace
can trigger a NULL pointer dereference by calling VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS
with VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL or VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE flags before
ever setting up interrupts via VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_EVENTFD.
The vfio_cdx_msi_enable() function allocates the cdx_irqs array and
sets config_msi to 1 only when called through the EVENTFD path. The
trigger loop (for DATA_BOOL/DATA_NONE) assumed this had already been
done, but there was no enforcement of this call ordering.
This matches the protection used in the PCI VFIO driver where
vfio_pci_set_msi_trigger() checks irq_is() before the trigger loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: pressure: mprls0025pa: fix spi_transfer struct initialisation
Make sure that the spi_transfer struct is zeroed out before use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Clear VRAM on allocation to prevent stale data exposure
KFD VRAM allocations set AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_VRAM_WIPE_ON_RELEASE
but not AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_VRAM_CLEARED, leaving freshly allocated
VRAM with stale data from prior use observable by compute kernels.
The GEM ioctl path already sets VRAM_CLEARED for all userspace
allocations via amdgpu_gem_create_ioctl() and
amdgpu_mode_dumb_create(). The KFD path was missing this flag,
allowing stale page table remnants to leak into user buffers.
This causes crashes in RCCL P2P transport where non-zero data in
ptrExchange/head/tail fields corrupts the protocol handshake. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: Fix PF driver crash with kexec kernel booting
During a kexec reboot the hardware is not power-cycled, so AF state from
the old kernel can persist into the new kernel. When AF and PF drivers
are built as modules, the PF driver may probe before AF reinitializes
the hardware.
The PF driver treats the RVUM block revision as an indication that AF
initialization is complete. If this value is left uncleared at shutdown,
PF may incorrectly assume AF is ready and access stale hardware state,
leading to a crash.
Clear the RVUM block revision during AF shutdown to avoid PF
mis-detecting AF readiness after kexec. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: use kzalloc to zero-initialize security descriptor buffer
Commit 62e7dd0a39c2d ("smb: common: change the data type of num_aces
to le16") split struct smb_acl's __le32 num_aces field into __le16
num_aces and __le16 reserved. The reserved field corresponds to Sbz2
in the MS-DTYP ACL wire format, which must be zero [1].
When building an ACL descriptor in build_sec_desc(), we are using a
kmalloc()'ed descriptor buffer and writing the fields explicitly using
le16() writes now. This never writes to the 2 byte reserved field,
leaving it as uninitialized heap data.
When the reserved field happens to contain non-zero slab garbage,
Samba rejects the security descriptor with "ndr_pull_security_descriptor
failed: Range Error", causing chmod to fail with EINVAL.
Change kmalloc() to kzalloc() to ensure the entire buffer is
zero-initialized.
[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/20233ed8-a6c6-4097-aafa-dd545ed24428 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: intel-dg: Fix accessing regions before setting nregions
The regions array is counted by nregions, but it's set only after
accessing it:
[] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/mtd/devices/mtd_intel_dg.c:750:15
[] index 0 is out of range for type '<unknown> [*]'
Fix it by also fixing an undesired behavior: the loop silently ignores
ENOMEM and continues setting the other entries. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: don't zero the entire extent if EXT4_EXT_DATA_PARTIAL_VALID1
When allocating initialized blocks from a large unwritten extent, or
when splitting an unwritten extent during end I/O and converting it to
initialized, there is currently a potential issue of stale data if the
extent needs to be split in the middle.
0 A B N
[UUUUUUUUUUUU] U: unwritten extent
[--DDDDDDDD--] D: valid data
|<- ->| ----> this range needs to be initialized
ext4_split_extent() first try to split this extent at B with
EXT4_EXT_DATA_ENTIRE_VALID1 and EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT flag set, but
ext4_split_extent_at() failed to split this extent due to temporary lack
of space. It zeroout B to N and mark the entire extent from 0 to N
as written.
0 A B N
[WWWWWWWWWWWW] W: written extent
[SSDDDDDDDDZZ] Z: zeroed, S: stale data
ext4_split_extent() then try to split this extent at A with
EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2 flag set. This time, it split successfully and left
a stale written extent from 0 to A.
0 A B N
[WW|WWWWWWWWWW]
[SS|DDDDDDDDZZ]
Fix this by pass EXT4_EXT_DATA_PARTIAL_VALID1 to ext4_split_extent_at()
when splitting at B, don't convert the entire extent to written and left
it as unwritten after zeroing out B to N. The remaining work is just
like the standard two-part split. ext4_split_extent() will pass the
EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2 flag when it calls ext4_split_extent_at() for the
second time, allowing it to properly handle the split. If the split is
successful, it will keep extent from 0 to A as unwritten. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/chrome: cros_ec_typec: Init mutex in Thunderbolt registration
cros_typec_register_thunderbolt() missed initializing the `adata->lock`
mutex. This leads to a NULL dereference when the mutex is later
acquired (e.g. in cros_typec_altmode_work()).
Initialize the mutex in cros_typec_register_thunderbolt() to fix the
issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Reinit dev->spinlock between attachments to low-level drivers
`struct comedi_device` is the main controlling structure for a COMEDI
device created by the COMEDI subsystem. It contains a member `spinlock`
containing a spin-lock that is initialized by the COMEDI subsystem, but
is reserved for use by a low-level driver attached to the COMEDI device
(at least since commit 25436dc9d84f ("Staging: comedi: remove RT
code")).
Some COMEDI devices (those created on initialization of the COMEDI
subsystem when the "comedi.comedi_num_legacy_minors" parameter is
non-zero) can be attached to different low-level drivers over their
lifetime using the `COMEDI_DEVCONFIG` ioctl command. This can result in
inconsistent lock states being reported when there is a mismatch in the
spin-lock locking levels used by each low-level driver to which the
COMEDI device has been attached. Fix it by reinitializing
`dev->spinlock` before calling the low-level driver's `attach` function
pointer if `CONFIG_LOCKDEP` is enabled. |
