| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate embedded INIT chunk and address list lengths in cookie
sctp_unpack_cookie() only checked that the embedded INIT chunk length
did not exceed the remaining cookie payload, but did not ensure that the
INIT chunk is large enough to contain a complete INIT header.
A malformed COOKIE_ECHO can therefore carry a truncated INIT chunk whose
length field is smaller than sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk). Later,
sctp_process_init() accesses INIT parameters unconditionally, which may
lead to out-of-bounds reads.
In addition, raw_addr_list_len is not fully validated against the
remaining cookie payload. When cookie authentication is disabled, an
attacker can supply an oversized raw_addr_list_len and cause
sctp_raw_to_bind_addrs() to read beyond the end of the cookie. The
address parser also lacks sufficient bounds checks for parameter headers
and lengths, allowing malformed address parameters to trigger
out-of-bounds reads.
Fix this by:
- requiring the embedded INIT chunk length to be at least sizeof(struct
sctp_init_chunk);
- validating that the INIT chunk and raw address list together fit
within the cookie payload;
- verifying sufficient data exists for each address parameter header and
payload before parsing it.
Note that sctp_verify_init() must be called after sctp_unpack_cookie()
and before sctp_process_init() when cookie authentication is disabled.
This will be addressed in a separate patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix OOB in pcpu_init_value
An out-of-bounds read occurs when copying element from a
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE map to another pcpu map with the
same value_size that is not rounded up to 8 bytes.
The issue happens when:
1. A CGROUP_STORAGE map is created with value_size not aligned to
8 bytes (e.g., 4 bytes)
2. A pcpu map is created with the same value_size (e.g., 4 bytes)
3. Update element in 2 with data in 1
pcpu_init_value assumes that all sources are rounded up to 8 bytes,
and invokes copy_map_value_long to make a data copy, However, the
assumption doesn't stand since there are some cases where the source
may not be rounded up to 8 bytes, e.g., CGROUP_STORAGE, skb->data.
the verifier verifies exactly the size that the source claims, not
the size rounded up to 8 bytes by kernel, an OOB happens when the
source has only 4 bytes while the copy size(4) is rounded up to 8. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents
Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing
dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen()
with unchecked nameoffs.
If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize,
maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the
directory block.
nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of
`sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)` as well [1].
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds reads in process_message_header()
If the message frame is (maliciously) corrupted in a way that the
length of the control segment ends up being less than the size of the
message header or a different frame is made to look like a message
frame, out-of-bounds reads may ensue in process_message_header().
Perform an explicit bounds check before decoding the message header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix potential out-of-bounds read in iwl_mvm_nd_match_info_handler()
The memcpy function assumes the dynamic array notif->matches is at least
as large as the number of bytes to copy. Otherwise, results->matches may
contain unwanted data. To guarantee safety, extend the validation in one
of the checks to ensure sufficient packet length.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy PDH cert to userspace if PSP command failed
When retrieving the PDH cert, don't attempt to copy the blobs to userspace
if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 2084 at addr ffff8885c4ab8aa0 by task syz.0.186/21033
CPU: 51 UID: 0 PID: 21033 Comm: syz.0.186 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.84.12-0 11/17/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x3d3/0x7c0 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2347
sev_ioctl+0x2a2/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2568
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy ID to userspace if PSP command failed
When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don't attempt to copy the ID blob to
userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an
invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying
the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated
buffer and leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388
CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222
sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error. |
| AMI APTIOV contains vulnerabilities
in BIOS where users may cause “Buffer Access with Incorrect Length
Value” by local access. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could
lead to buffer overflows, memory corruption, and arbitrary code execution, and
also impact Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
| F´ (F Prime) is a framework that enables development and deployment of spaceflight and other embedded software applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Svc::TlmPacketizer TlmRecv_handler fixed-slot copy TlmRecv_handler copies val.getSize bytes into entry.channelSize storage without confirming that the runtime value fits. When a telemetry update for a configured channel carries a serialized value larger than that channel fixed slot, the copy overwrites adjacent channel fields and causes corrupted packetized telemetry to be emitted. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix zeropoint update where i_size > remote_i_size
Fix the update of the zero point[*] by netfs_release_folio() when there is
uncommitted data in the pagecache beyond the folio being released but the
on-server EOF is in this folio (ie. i_size > remote_i_size). The update
needs to limit zero_point to remote_i_size, not i_size as i_size is a local
phenomenon reflecting updates made locally to the pagecache, not stuff
written to the server. remote_i_size tracks the server's i_size.
[*] The zero point is the file position from which we can assume that the
server will just return zeros, so we can avoid generating reads.
Note that netfs_invalidate_folio() probably doesn't need fixing as
zero_point should be updated by setattr after truncation or fallocate.
Found with:
fsx -q -N 1000000 -p 10000 -o 128000 -l 600000 \
/xfstest.test/junk --replay-ops=junk.fsxops
using the following as junk.fsxops:
truncate 0x0 0x1bbae 0x82864
write 0x3ef2e 0xf9c8 0x1bbae
write 0x67e05 0xcb5a 0x4e8f6
mapread 0x57781 0x85b6 0x7495f
copy_range 0x5d3d 0x10329 0x54fac 0x7495f
write 0x64710 0x1c2b 0x7495f
mapread 0x64000 0x1000 0x7495f
on cifs with the default cache option.
It shows read-gaps on folio 0x64 failing with a short read (ie. it hits
EOF) if the FMODE_READ check is commented out in netfs_perform_write():
if (//(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) ||
netfs_is_cache_enabled(ctx)) {
and no fscache. This was initially found with the generic/522 xfstest. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks
tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from
data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before
checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer.
A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can
therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data.
KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING
request reached that path:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
tlv_data_is_valid()
add_advertising()
hci_mgmt_cmd()
hci_sock_sendmsg()
Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection
so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the
parser looks at data[i + 1]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()
snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names
buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items
remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).
While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0
error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks
maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track
of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic
before the return value is examined.
Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified
strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.
Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: br_nd_send: validate ND option lengths
br_nd_send() walks ND options according to option-provided lengths.
A malformed option can make the parser advance beyond the computed
option span or use a too-short source LLADDR option payload.
Validate option lengths against the remaining NS option area before
advancing, and only read source LLADDR when the option is large enough
for an Ethernet address. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/snapshot: fix dumping of the unaligned regions
The snapshotting code internally aligns data segment to 16 bytes. This
works fine for DPU code (where most of the regions are aligned), but
fails for snapshotting of the DSI data (because DSI data region is
shifted by 4 bytes). Fix the code by removing length alignment and by
accurately printing last registers in the region. While reworking the
code also fix the 16x memory overallocation in
msm_disp_state_dump_regs().
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/725449/ |
| A flaw was found in libarchive. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to trigger a heap overflow by providing a specially crafted tar archive. The issue occurs during the parsing of a PAX extended header containing a malformed SUN.holesdata sparse-file attribute. Successful exploitation could lead to a denial of service, making the system unavailable, or potentially allow for arbitrary code execution, giving the attacker control over the affected system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: don't overconsume buffers when using MSG_TRUNC
When a recv/recvmsg is issued with MSG_TRUNC and the incoming packet is
larger than the provided buffer, the net layer returns the full length
of the packet rather than the number of bytes actually copied into the
buffer. As a result, io_uring advances more of the provided buffer ring
than was actually filled. Use the actual filled region size to consume
the buffer, but still return the full size to preserve MSG_TRUNC
semantics.
Take care with multishot, because that seems to already truncate the
consumption based on the available payload size.
This was reported in https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/1619.
[axboe: fold in size_t unsigned fix] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped
skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated
on !skb->inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it
outlives the encapsulation it describes.
Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose
inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a
label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives
key->eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push
again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record:
skb->network_header = skb->inner_network_header;
so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed:
if (skb_network_offset(skb) > MAX_L2_LEN)
a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value:
unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);
memcpy(&data->l2_data, skb->data, hlen);
which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer.
Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20
RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000
prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0
ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0
do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0
do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30
ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450
Same root-cause shape as commit 975b5b067f52 ("ipv6: sr: restore network
header before routing and forwarding"): a stale network header offset
reaching a consumer that widens it. Here it originates in the MPLS
push/pop path.
Clear inner_protocol once the packet is no longer MPLS, so a later push
re-records the current header. net/sched/act_mpls.c is the only other
skb_mpls_pop() caller and gets the same fix; sch_frag.c saves and
restores inner_protocol around fragmentation in the same way OVS does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: smbus: reject oversized block transfers in the common path
The SMBus block transfer length data->block[0] is validated in
i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated() but that check runs too late for tracepoints
and is skipped entirely when the adapter provides a native smbus_xfer
implementation. This allows user-controlled oversized block lengths to
reach tracepoint memcpy calls and driver callbacks unchecked.
Add an early validation in __i2c_smbus_xfer() that rejects block
transfers whose caller-supplied length is zero or exceeds
I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX before any tracepoint fires or driver callback
runs. data->block[0] is filled in by the device on SMBus block reads,
so the check is scoped to operations where the length is actually
supplied by the caller. This is consistent with the existing -EINVAL
convention in the emulated path and protects all downstream consumers
at once: the smbus_write tracepoint, all native smbus_xfer driver
implementations, and the emulated path.
Two distinct bugs are fixed by this change:
Bug 1: smbus_write tracepoint OOB (include/trace/events/smbus.h)
trace_smbus_write() fires before any validation and copies
data->block[0]+1 bytes into a 34-byte event buffer. With
block[0]=0xfe the tracepoint copies 255 bytes, overflowing by 221.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in trace_event_raw_event_smbus_write+0x27c/0x530
Read of size 255 at addr ffff88800d98fcf8 by task poc_smbus/91
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x80
trace_event_raw_event_smbus_write+0x27c/0x530
__i2c_smbus_xfer+0x43a/0xa40
i2c_smbus_xfer+0x19e/0x340
i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x38f/0x7f0
i2cdev_ioctl+0x35e/0x680
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x147/0x1e0
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x15a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Bug 2: i2c-stub I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA OOB (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c)
stub_xfer() implements .smbus_xfer directly and only clamps
block[0] against 256-command, not I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX. With
block[0]=0xff and command=0 the loop accesses block[1+i] for
i up to 254, far past the 34-byte union.
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223:44
index 34 is out of range for type '__u8 [34]'
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd7/0x120
stub_xfer+0x1971/0x198f [i2c_stub]
__i2c_smbus_xfer+0x306/0xa40
i2c_smbus_xfer+0x19e/0x340
i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x38f/0x7f0
i2cdev_ioctl+0x35e/0x680
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x147/0x1e0
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x15a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Both traces reproduced on v7.0-rc6+i2c/for-current with KASAN+UBSAN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix out-of-bounds access in read_block_state()
read_block_state() calculates nr_pages before taking dev_lock. If the
device is reset and reinitialized with a smaller disksize before lock
acquisition, nr_pages still describes the old table. The subsequent loop
can then call slot_lock() past the end of the newly allocated table.
Read disksize after acquiring dev_lock and checking that the device is
initialized. The read lock then keeps the table and its bound stable for
the duration of the scan. |
