| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A vulnerability was identified in oretnom23 file-management-system-php up to 2e3c1ebe60f121e8df4fb3f544f0e9591d9a01e4. This affects the function Login of the file admin_class.php. The manipulation of the argument username/password leads to sql injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| baserCMS is a website development framework. In versions 5.2.3 before 5.3.2 and 5.4.0 before 5.4.2, the optional BcThemeFile plugin's Admin API validates a raw path in ThemeFilesService::update() and getFullpath(), but ThemeFileForm::_execute() subsequently applies rawurldecode() to fullpath before writing. Because normalizePath() resolves only literal dot segments, percent-encoded traversal can pass the containment checks and become a path outside the theme directory at the write sink. An authenticated administrator can write PHP files into writable locations such as webroot and execute them, exceeding the intended theme-template editing boundary. The source also identifies the same check-before-decode ordering in ThemeFilesService::copy(), although that path was not dynamically verified. Exploitation requires the non-default plugin, an administrator session, and a same-origin Origin header; USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=false does not block session-authenticated requests. The Admin web form is not affected by this encoded-path tampering because FormProtection protects fullpath. This is a third bypass of the protections associated with CVE-2026-30940, using encoded traversal decoded after validation. This issue has been patched in versions 5.3.2 and 5.4.2. |
| The WireGuard VPN service in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c updated the peer endpoint from a message it could not authenticate. In handle_transport_data(), when the 32-bit receiver index of an incoming transport-data message matched no session, the code both scheduled a new handshake and copied the datagram's source address into peer->endpoint with memcpy(&peer->endpoint, peer_addr, sizeof(peer->endpoint)). Because the receiver index is unknown, there is no key with which such a message could be verified, so the address written into peer->endpoint is entirely attacker-supplied. Every other endpoint update in the implementation happens only after authentication — after the Noise handshake in handle_handshake_init(), or after AEAD decryption plus the anti-replay check in wg_process_data_message().
The WireGuard listener is registered with net_udp_register() using no remote address or port filter and defaults to UDP port 51820 (CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PORT), and wg_ctrl_recv() resolves the peer by interface rather than by any cryptographic identity. Any host able to send a UDP datagram to that port can therefore reach the defect off-path, with no need to observe legitimate traffic: a 16-byte datagram carrying the transport-data type, zeroed reserved bytes and an arbitrary receiver index is sufficient. The vulnerable branch runs whenever the peer has neither a valid handshake nor a current keypair — the state at boot and after a session expires.
A single spoofed datagram redirects peer->endpoint to an address of the attacker's choosing, and all subsequent handshake initiations, keepalives and encrypted data packets are sent there. The legitimate peer never receives the initiations and so never re-authenticates, and nothing resets the endpoint afterwards, leaving the tunnel persistently unusable on devices whose peer does not initiate handshakes itself. The attacker can also relay the redirected initiations to the real peer to place itself in the path of the tunnel, observing ciphertext and traffic metadata and selectively dropping packets. WireGuard's end-to-end cryptography still prevents decryption or forgery of tunnel content, so the impact is loss of availability plus limited confidentiality, not key compromise.
The fix removes the endpoint learning from this path entirely: the stale-session recovery is kept, but the handshake is sent only to an endpoint learnt from an authenticated message, falling back to the configured cfg_endpoint, and the message is dropped when neither is known. CONFIG_WIREGUARD is marked experimental and is not enabled by default. |
| The arm64 MMU backend invalidates a single virtual address from the TLB with invalidate_tlb_page() in arch/arm64/core/mmu.c, which issued TLBI VAE1{IS} with an operand of virt >> 12. That operand encodes the ASID in bits [63:48], so the invalidation only ever matched ASID 0 (the kernel page tables) and global entries. Memory domains, however, are allocated ASIDs starting at 1 in arch_mem_domain_init(), and every domain-private leaf created by private_map() is mapped with MT_NG, i.e. non-global. A domain's cached translation therefore survived the invalidation.
All callers of invalidate_tlb_page() are demand-paging paths. When the eviction algorithm reclaims a frame, page_frame_prepare_locked() in kernel/mmu.c calls arch_mem_page_out(), which marks the kernel leaf invalid, propagates the invalid descriptor into every domain via sync_domains(), and then flushes only ASID 0. do_page_fault() immediately reuses the very same page frame for the incoming mapping through arch_mem_page_in(). A user thread that had already touched the evicted page — a k_mem_partition added with arch_mem_domain_partition_add(), or its own stack mapped by map_thread_stack() — retains a valid EL0 read/write translation to that physical frame under its own ASID.
Unprivileged code running in a user thread can drive memory pressure to force eviction and then keep accessing the stale address, obtaining read and write access to whatever the kernel subsequently placed in that frame: supervisor data, another memory domain's partition, or another thread's stack. This defeats the isolation that CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to enforce, allowing information disclosure and memory corruption up to full compromise of the system.
The fix switches the implementation to TLBI VAAE1{IS}, which matches every ASID and both global and non-global entries, so no domain-tagged translation survives a page out, dirty-bit update or access-flag clear. Exploitation requires an arm64 build with both CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_DEMAND_PAGING enabled, an active backing store, and at least one demand-paged page that is also privately mapped into a user memory domain. The same commit additionally stops globalize_table() from stripping EL0 permission and non-global attributes off domain-private leaves during paging synchronization, which previously caused user threads to lose access to their own partitions and stacks. |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. Prior to version 26.05, Configuration.getWebApiToken returns the empty string when webapi.authorization.token is not configured. AuthorizationFilter compares the supplied token against this default without first checking that the configured token is non-empty. A request to any @AuthorizationBinding-protected endpoint with an empty ?token= value is therefore accepted. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. |
| The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint. bt_hci_tx_sync_in() allocated that buffer from bt_hci_ep_pool, a fixed pool whose slots are only USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 on full-speed-only builds), and then performed net_buf_add_mem(buf, bt_buf->data, bt_buf->len) with no length check. HCI event and ACL buffers are sized by CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE and can be far larger, so the copy runs past the end of the 64-byte slot into the adjacent slots and into whatever follows the statically allocated pool.
The device runs the local Bluetooth controller in raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW), so the oversized packets originate over the air. With the HCI buffer sizes recommended for full-featured controllers, an unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes: a connected peer that negotiates Data Length Extension can send ACL fragments up to CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX bytes, and an attacker that merely broadcasts extended advertising data reaches the same path through LE Extended Advertising Report events, which the controller fragments only to CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE. In the stock configuration the overflow is already reached without any radio traffic: the mandatory Read Supported Commands command-complete event is 70 bytes and overruns the 64-byte slot by six bytes on every host initialization.
Because net_buf_add_mem() validates tailroom only through an assertion unless CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING is enabled, builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=n — the usual production setting — silently corrupt memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool with attacker-chosen contents, which on a target without memory protection between subsystems can lead to arbitrary code execution. Builds with assertions enabled fail the assertion instead and panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service. The fix introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction while leaving the host-to-device pool at the endpoint packet size, which is already bounds-checked during reassembly. |
| A vulnerability in the command line interface of AOS-8 could allow an authenticated remote attacker with high privileges to conduct a server-side request forgery (SSRF) attack. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system. |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, an attacker who captures a pending invite token can replay it to obtain a passkey-registration credential and register their own passkey on the invited account, taking control of that account. For a staff or tenant-admin invite this yields access to the tenant context tied to that account. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.1. |
| ConnMan through 2.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow via a DHCPv6 Reply message. This occurs in get_domains in gdhcp/client.c. It copies a fixed NS_MAXDNAME (1025) bytes from a DHCPv6 DOMAIN_LIST (option 24) value into a 1026-byte stack buffer dns_name regardless of the actual option length, then walks DNS labels with an unbounded "c += jump + 1" loop. A crafted DHCPv6 REPLY with a DOMAIN_LIST option of >= 1025 non-zero bytes makes the label walk leave the buffer and read/write '.' past its end in attacker-chosen strides. An on-link attacker can trigger this without authentication via a forged Router Advertisement (O=1) and a forged DHCPv6 REPLY matching xid/CLIENTID with a long DOMAIN_LIST. The impact is unauthenticated on-link crash of connmand (runs as root). This was introduced in bb06c47. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 42.11.16, 43.8.1, 44.9.1, and 45.0.0-beta.6, Electron does not block compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates in Chromium networking, Node.js tls, Node.js https, or Node.js fetch. An attacker who holds a certificate issued through one of these intermediates and can intercept network traffic can impersonate a TLS server to an affected application. This issue is fixed in versions 42.11.16, 43.8.1, 44.9.1, and 45.0.0-beta.6. |
| virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 21.14.9 until 21.14.13, the bash bin/activate script can copy an attacker-controlled --prompt value into PS1 without escaping dollar signs or backticks when both promptvars and POSIX mode are disabled during activation. Re-enabling promptvars, running set -o posix, or starting an interactive child bash that inherits the exported PS1 can then expand command substitution in the stored VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT value and execute commands as the user who activates the environment. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.13. |
| Twisted is an event-based framework for internet applications, supporting Python 3.6+. Prior to 26.10.0rc1, twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC.dataReceived retains all bytes received without a line feed in its per-connection buffer and applies no maximum line length. The twisted.words.service.IRCUser server subclass inherits this behavior, and buffering occurs before PASS, NICK, or USER authentication commands. An unauthenticated connection can continuously grow the buffer until the shared server process runs out of memory and drops all users. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.0rc1. |
| Twisted is an event-based framework for internet applications, supporting Python 3.6+. Prior to 26.10.0rc1, twisted.conch.telnet.Telnet.dataReceived appends every byte received after IAC SB to a persistent subnegotiation buffer until IAC SE is received, without applying a maximum length. Telnet option negotiation occurs before authentication, so an unauthenticated peer can omit the terminator and continuously grow the buffer. The resulting memory exhaustion can terminate the process and every service it hosts. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.0rc1. |
| AstronRPA through 1.1.6 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the OpenResty gateway's auth_handler.lua that accepts any Bearer token without validation. Unauthenticated attackers can send arbitrary Bearer values to reach /api/resource/ and /api/rpa-ai-service/ routes and spoof X-User-Id or user_id headers to act as any user. |
| The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates a small pseudo-register file, where the bus controller first writes a register number and then writes or reads payload bytes. The selected register (b->reg_addr) and the data-phase flag (b->rxtx) were never cleared when the controller issued an I2C STOP, so after a completed transfer the target still had a data register selected while the packet buffer that register refers to had already been consumed and set to NULL by mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop().
A controller on the bus can re-enter the same branch of mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop() with a NULL buffer using two ordinary transactions and no authentication: first a normal packet write to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR followed by STOP (which delivers and frees b->rx_pkt), then a bare read transaction followed by STOP. The failing read_requested() call leaves the stale state untouched and the I2C driver still delivers the STOP callback, which then calls mctp_bus_rx() with a NULL packet. The symmetric case exists on the transmit side, where the stale MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TX_MSG_ADDR selection dereferences b->tx_pkt->end after b->tx_pkt has been cleared and additionally signals b->tx_complete a second time, causing the next outbound packet to be dropped.
The dereference happens in the I2C target interrupt handler, so on any target that traps accesses to address 0 the result is a fatal exception and a device reset or halt — a denial of service inflicted by any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (for example compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or on the BMC). On parts where address 0 is readable, the impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer being handed to the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets. No attacker-controlled value is written and no confidentiality or integrity boundary is crossed.
The fix resets b->reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b->rxtx at every STOP, so a new register must be selected before any data phase can run again. Only builds that opt into the experimental CONFIG_MCTP subsystem with CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET=y are affected. |
| The kernel helper z_waitq_head() (kernel/include/wait_q.h) reads the head of a thread wait queue, but on SMP systems it was called from several places without holding the scheduler spinlock _sched_spinlock that serializes wait-queue mutation. The consequential call site is z_timer_expiration_handler() in kernel/timer.c, which held only the timer subsystem lock timer_lock while reading timer->wait_q and then unpending, setting the return value of, and readying the thread it obtained. halt_thread() in kernel/sched.c removes an aborted thread from its wait queue while holding only _sched_spinlock, so the two paths are not mutually exclusive.
When the last waiter is removed on another CPU inside that window, sys_dlist_peek_head() can return the list sentinel — a pointer into the k_timer object itself — typed as a struct k_thread * (with CONFIG_WAITQ_SCALABLE, rb_get_min() can return an arbitrary node of a tree being restructured), or it can return a pointer to a thread that has already been unpended and, for dynamically allocated threads, freed. The handler then calls unpend_thread_no_timeout(), which performs a sys_dlist_remove() through pointers read from that object, and arch_thread_return_value_set(), which writes unconditionally through the pointer.
The result is out-of-bounds and use-after-free writes in supervisor context, plus scheduler state corruption; a milder outcome is a thread that has re-pended elsewhere being woken with a success return value from an unrelated blocking call. All of the primitives needed to drive the interleaving — k_timer_start(), k_timer_status_sync(), k_thread_create() and k_thread_abort() — are system calls, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled an unprivileged user-mode thread can attempt the race against kernel-owned data.
Exploitation requires a multi-CPU build (CONFIG_MP_MAX_NUM_CPUS greater than one; the affected region is a no-op on uniprocessor targets), local code execution, and winning a narrow timing window, so the practical outcome is most often a kernel crash rather than controlled corruption. The fix splits the helper into z_waitq_head_locked() for callers that already hold the scheduler spinlock and a z_waitq_head() that acquires it, and brings the timer expiration handler's head read, unpend and ready under a single LOCK_SCHED_SPINLOCK region. |
| GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.0.0 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged rule in specified_rules repeatedly compares fields that share response names and recursively re-compares flattened inline fragments during the validation phase. The prior named-fragment memoization does not cover this path, so nested repeated inline fragments can drive quadratic and worst-case O(n²·m²) CPU work before any resolver or AST-based depth or complexity control runs. An unauthenticated remote attacker can submit a shallow, highly compressible GraphQL query that pins a worker process and can saturate a multi-worker service. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1. |
| The user-mode verifier for the peci_transfer() system call, z_vrfy_peci_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_handlers.c, checked only the device object permission and copied the caller-supplied struct peci_msg with k_usermode_from_copy(). That copy validates the outer structure only; the buf pointers and len values inside the embedded struct peci_buf members tx_buffer and rx_buffer remained fully caller-controlled and were passed unchecked to the driver.
Every in-tree PECI driver dereferences those pointers in supervisor mode: peci_npcx_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_npcx.c and peci_it8xxx2_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_ite_it8xxx2.c copy hardware bytes into rx_buffer.buf[i] and read command bytes out of tx_buffer.buf[i], and peci_xec_read()/peci_xec_write() in drivers/peci/peci_mchp_xec.c do the same with no bound on rx_buffer.len at all. A user-mode thread that has been granted the PECI device object — the normal way an application exposes a device under CONFIG_USERSPACE — could therefore point rx_buffer.buf at kernel data structures and have the driver write hardware-supplied bytes there, or point tx_buffer.buf at kernel memory and have its contents pushed onto the PECI/eSPI out-of-band bus.
The impact is a full user-mode-to-kernel escape: an arbitrary kernel write primitive (integrity and, through it, code execution at supervisor privilege), an arbitrary kernel read disclosed to a PECI bus observer, and a trivially reachable supervisor-mode fault if an unmapped address is supplied. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, one of the PECI drivers enabled (CONFIG_PECI_NPCX, CONFIG_PECI_XEC or CONFIG_PECI_ITE_IT8XXX2), and local code execution in a user-mode thread holding the PECI device.
The fix adds K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ() and K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE() checks over the two embedded buffers, with a size_add_overflow() guard on the frame-check-sequence byte accounted for in the RX length. |
| A weakness has been identified in oretnom23 php-travel-agency-system. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file admin/update.php. This manipulation of the argument action/full_name/visa_no/hiden/title/description/page_id/user causes sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This product uses a rolling release model to deliver continuous updates. As a result, specific version information for affected or updated releases is not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| toml-node is a TOML parser for Node.js and the browser. Prior to 5.0.1, the toml.parse() compiler's addTableArray() function in lib/compiler.js rescans the complete assignedPaths and valueAssignments bookkeeping sets for every array-of-tables header. Distinct [[name]] paths are not pruned, so a document with many such headers causes quadratic synchronous work and can block the Node.js event loop, denying service to other operations in the process. This issue is fixed in version 5.0.1. |
