| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: mcast: Fix a possible use-after-free when removing a bridge port
When per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over
all the bridge ports, disables the per-port multicast context on each
port and enables the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts instead. The
reverse happens when per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled.
When global multicast snooping is enabled, the bridge iterates over all
the bridge ports and enables the per-port multicast context on each
port. The reverse happens when multicast snooping is disabled.
The above scheme can result in a situation where both types of contexts
(per-port and per-{port, VLAN}) are enabled on a single bridge port:
# ip link add name br1 up type bridge mcast_snooping 1 mcast_querier 1 vlan_filtering 1
# ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy
# ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 1
# ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 0
# ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_snooping 1
This is not intended and it is a problem since the commit cited below.
Prior to this commit, when removing a bridge port,
br_multicast_disable_port() would disable the per-port multicast context
and the per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts would get disabled when
flushing VLANs.
After this commit, br_multicast_disable_port() only disables the
per-port multicast context if per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled.
If both types of contexts were enabled on the port when it was removed,
the per-port multicast context would remain enabled when freeing the
bridge port, leading to a use-after-free [1].
Fix by preventing the bridge from enabling / disabling the per-port
multicast contexts when toggling global multicast snooping if per-VLAN
multicast snooping is enabled.
[1]
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff88810f8bda78 object type: timer_list hint: br_ip6_multicast_port_query_expired (net/bridge/br_multicast.c:1927)
WARNING: lib/debugobjects.c:629 at debug_print_object+0x1b1/0x3e0, CPU#5: swapper/5/0
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__debug_check_no_obj_freed (lib/debugobjects.c:1116)
kfree (mm/slub.c:2620 mm/slub.c:6250 mm/slub.c:6565)
kobject_cleanup (lib/kobject.c:689)
rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617)
rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2869)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622)
__irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:656 kernel/softirq.c:496 kernel/softirq.c:735)
irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:752)
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1061 (discriminator 47))
</IRQ> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: pop cached request if it is usable
When submitting a bio to blk-mq, if the task should sleep after peeking
a cached request, but before it pops it, the plug flushes and calls
blk_mq_free_plug_rqs, freeing the cached_rqs. This creates a
use-after-free bug. Fix this by popping the cached request before any
possible blocking calls if it is suitable for use.
Popping this request first holds a queue reference, so avoid any
serialization races with queue freezes and can safely proceed with
dispatching that request to the driver. This potentially increases a
timing window from when a driver wants to freeze its queue to when
requests stop being dispatched. That scenario is off the fast path
though, and drivers need to appropriately handle requests during a
freeze request anyway.
The downside is the popped element needs to be individually freed when
we performed a bio plug merge. The cached request would have had to be
freed later anyway, but this patch does it inline with building the plug
list instead of after flushing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: synproxy: refresh tcphdr after skb_ensure_writable
synproxy_tstamp_adjust() rewrites the TCP timestamp option in place
and then patches the TCP checksum via inet_proto_csum_replace4() on
the caller-supplied tcphdr pointer. Both ipv4_synproxy_hook() and
ipv6_synproxy_hook() obtain that pointer with skb_header_pointer()
before calling in, so it may either alias skb->head directly or
point at the caller's on-stack _tcph buffer.
Between obtaining the pointer and using it, the function calls
skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend), which on a cloned or non-linear
skb invokes pskb_expand_head() and frees the old skb->head. After
that point the cached th is stale:
caller (ipv[46]_synproxy_hook)
th = skb_header_pointer(skb, ..., &_tcph)
synproxy_tstamp_adjust(skb, protoff, th, ...)
skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend)
pskb_expand_head() /* kfree(old skb->head) */
...
inet_proto_csum_replace4(&th->check, ...)
/* writes into freed head, or
into the caller's stack copy
leaving the on-wire checksum
stale */
The option bytes are written through skb->data and are fine; only
the checksum update goes through th and so lands in the wrong
place. The result is either a write into freed slab memory or a
packet leaving with a checksum that does not match its payload.
Fix by re-deriving th from skb->data + protoff immediately after
skb_ensure_writable() succeeds, so the subsequent checksum update
targets the linear, writable header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: free net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table()
ipv4_sysctl_exit_net() is currently freeing net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports
too soon.
Only after unregister_net_sysctl_table() we can be sure no threads can possibly
use the sysctls, including /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]()
Sashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and
iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr()
before an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb->head.
Fix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables
after the skb_cow() call.
Remove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu()
skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can change skb->head.
Reusing old_iph afer skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can cause an UAF.
Use instead ip_hdr(skb) as done in drivers/net/bareudp.c
and drivers/net/geneve.c.
Found by Sashiko. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: fix UAF in __blkcg_rstat_flush()
When multiple blkgs in the same blkcg are released concurrently,
a use-after-free can occur. The race happens when one blkg's
__blkcg_rstat_flush() removes another blkg's iostat entries via
llist_del_all(). The second blkg sees an empty list and proceeds
to free itself while the first is still iterating over its entries.
Move the flush from __blkg_release() (RCU callback) to blkg_release()
(before call_rcu). This ensures the RCU grace period waits for any
concurrent flush's rcu_read_lock() section to complete before freeing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done
tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to
crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike
the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously
(e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the
meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the
per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and
aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences
aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory.
Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51
Workqueue: events_unbound
Call Trace:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Allocated by task 169:
__kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415)
tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502)
tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72)
ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137)
setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446)
copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579)
create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132)
__x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Freed by task 8:
kfree (mm/slub.c:6566)
tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119)
cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix
slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt
side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before
crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous
return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY
return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt
path was left without the equivalent guard.
Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference
before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching
bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the
-EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the
synchronous success/error return and at the end of
tipc_aead_decrypt_done().
Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is
flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the
cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn
down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive
tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts
synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The
unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the
unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks
maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free
on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: re-lock request before replacing page cache folio
fuse_try_move_folio() unlocks the request on entry but does not
re-lock it on the success path. This means fuse_chan_abort() can end the
request and free the fuse_io_args (eg fuse_readpages_end()) while the
subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_try_move_folio() accesses the
fuse_io_args, leading to use-after-free issues.
Fix this by calling lock_request() before replace_page_cache_folio().
This ensures the request is locked on the success path which will
prevent the fuse_io_args from being freed while the later copying logic
runs, and also ensures that the ap->folios[i]->mapping is never null
since ap->folios[i] will always point to the newfolio after
replace_page_cache_folio(). |
| The Bluetooth LE host queues received L2CAP connection-oriented channel (CoC) data for deferred processing through a struct k_work embedded in the channel object (le_chan->rx_work, handler l2cap_rx_process()) whenever the channel uses a dynamic PSM (0x0080-0x00FF). Channel teardown in l2cap_chan_destroy() in subsys/bluetooth/host/l2cap.c cancels the retransmission-timeout work and drains the RX FIFO, but never cancels rx_work. Because that work item was submitted to the system workqueue while HCI receive processing runs on the dedicated Bluetooth RX workqueue (CONFIG_BT_RECV_WORKQ_BT, the default), a queued rx_work item can outlive the channel it points into.
A remote, unauthenticated peer with an established CoC channel triggers this by sending a data K-frame immediately followed by an L2CAP Disconnect Request. The K-frame submits rx_work to the system workqueue; because both workqueue threads are cooperative and the Bluetooth RX workqueue runs at the higher priority (K_PRIO_COOP(CONFIG_BT_RX_PRIO) versus CONFIG_SYSTEM_WORKQUEUE_PRIORITY), the pending item cannot run before the following Disconnect Request is processed in le_disconn_req() -> l2cap_chan_del() -> l2cap_chan_destroy(). The stack then invokes the released() callback, which the API documents as meaning the stack has dropped all references and the application may free the channel memory.
The application therefore frees or re-accepts into an object that the system workqueue still holds in its pending list. If the memory is freed and reallocated, the workqueue later dereferences a list node and a handler function pointer read from reused memory; if the object is re-used for a later connection, l2cap_chan_add() calls k_work_init() on a still-enqueued work item, corrupting the workqueue's pending list so that unrelated work items are dropped or the queue spins on a looped list. A related variant lets l2cap_rx_process() run concurrently with teardown, racing the net_buf unref of le_chan->_sdu and the clearing of chan->conn.
The fix routes the channel RX work to the Bluetooth workqueue - the same context in which every teardown path runs - and adds an explicit k_work_cancel() of le_chan->rx_work in l2cap_chan_destroy(), so no reference to the channel survives the released() callback. Configurations without CONFIG_BT_L2CAP_DYNAMIC_CHANNEL, or that only use SIG-assigned PSMs (EATT 0x0027, OTS 0x0025) which take the inline receive path, are not affected. |
| Improper resolution of path equivalence in Visual Studio Code allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Bind Filter Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Double free in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Use after free in Windows Win32 Kernel Subsystem allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Double free in Windows Hyper-V allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Bluetooth Port Driver allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over an adjacent network. |
| During an upload, curl mishandles HTTP/2 `RST_STREAM` received from the server
(with reason `HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED` or `REFUSED_STREAM`) leading to a use after
free of a `struct Curl_easy` object. |
| Use after free in Windows Graphics Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| libIEC61850 is an open-source implementation of IEC 61850 client and server protocols including MMS, GOOSE, Sampled Values, and R-Session. From 1.6.1 until 1.6.2, a successful MMS ObtainFile operation closes MmsObtainFileTask::fileHandle but leaves the stale non-NULL value in a task marked MMS_FILE_UPLOAD_STATE_NOT_USED. If a later ObtainFile request reuses that task and destination creation fails, MMS_FILE_UPLOAD_STATE_SEND_OBTAIN_FILE_ERROR_DESTINATION cleanup closes the stale FILE object again. Servers with the MMS file service and ObtainFile enabled can therefore be crashed remotely by the success-then-failure request sequence. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.2. |
