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Search Results (3087 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-116194 | 1 Rclone | 1 Rclone | 2026-10-25 | 6.8 Medium |
| Rclone from 1.52.0 before 1.75.2 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the pCloud backend's localhost OAuth callback, which disables the state check and trusts the hostname parameter. Malicious web pages can send a stateless request to port 53682 during authorization, planting attacker tokens and API hosts so later transfers reach the attacker. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116189 | 1 Rclone | 1 Rclone | 2026-10-25 | 7.5 High |
| rclone from 1.55.0 before 1.75.2 contains a signature verification bypass in stable selfupdate that trusts checksums from unsigned bytes preceding the PGP-clearsigned SHA256SUMS block. Attackers controlling the release distribution path can prepend an unsigned checksum line matching a malicious archive, causing selfupdate to install an attacker-controlled rclone executable. | ||||
| CVE-2026-69650 | 1 Microsoft | 22 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 11 24h2 and 19 more | 2026-10-25 | 7.8 High |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature in Windows Key Distribution Center allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-115933 | 1 Gitroomhq | 1 Postiz-app | 2026-10-24 | 9.9 Critical |
| Postiz signs its session, invitation and password reset tokens with one shared secret and without any marker of what a token is for. A route that refreshes the credentials of a browser-extension channel signed data taken from the request itself and stored the result where the requesting user can read it back. A user could therefore obtain a validly signed token containing any claims they choose, which the application accepts as a session, as an organization invitation with a chosen role, as a password reset or as an enterprise provisioning token. A second, narrower route that creates team invitations signs extra fields from the request body in the same way. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46346 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 6.5 Medium |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. Prior to version 26.05, the password reset token is predictably based on the time of the reset request. An attacker who knows the target's email address can request a reset and then brute-force the token. Exploiting this finding alone forces an unauthorized password reset on any account. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55459 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 7.4 High |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 25.01 to before version 26.05, AuthenticationEndpoint.verifyOpenIdToken builds its verifier as JWT.require(algorithm).withIssuer(issuer).build() and does not enforce the aud claim during cryptographic validation. The aud check is performed manually afterwards via a single string-equality call, which only handles single-string aud values. In a multi-RP IdP setup, a token whose single-string aud matches the viewer's client ID but was issued for a different relying party passes the check and authenticates the attacker as the token's sub. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-10141 | 1 Totolink | 1 X2000r | 2026-10-23 | 9.1 Critical |
| A Unsigned Firmware vulnerability exists in the boa Firmware Update functionality of X2000R (version(s): TOTOLINK-X2000R-Gh-V1.0.0-B20250421.1327). A specially crafted firmware binary can lead to arbitrary firmware update. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79977 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-10-23 | 8.2 High |
| The WireGuard VPN service in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c updated the peer endpoint from a message it could not authenticate. In handle_transport_data(), when the 32-bit receiver index of an incoming transport-data message matched no session, the code both scheduled a new handshake and copied the datagram's source address into peer->endpoint with memcpy(&peer->endpoint, peer_addr, sizeof(peer->endpoint)). Because the receiver index is unknown, there is no key with which such a message could be verified, so the address written into peer->endpoint is entirely attacker-supplied. Every other endpoint update in the implementation happens only after authentication — after the Noise handshake in handle_handshake_init(), or after AEAD decryption plus the anti-replay check in wg_process_data_message(). The WireGuard listener is registered with net_udp_register() using no remote address or port filter and defaults to UDP port 51820 (CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PORT), and wg_ctrl_recv() resolves the peer by interface rather than by any cryptographic identity. Any host able to send a UDP datagram to that port can therefore reach the defect off-path, with no need to observe legitimate traffic: a 16-byte datagram carrying the transport-data type, zeroed reserved bytes and an arbitrary receiver index is sufficient. The vulnerable branch runs whenever the peer has neither a valid handshake nor a current keypair — the state at boot and after a session expires. A single spoofed datagram redirects peer->endpoint to an address of the attacker's choosing, and all subsequent handshake initiations, keepalives and encrypted data packets are sent there. The legitimate peer never receives the initiations and so never re-authenticates, and nothing resets the endpoint afterwards, leaving the tunnel persistently unusable on devices whose peer does not initiate handshakes itself. The attacker can also relay the redirected initiations to the real peer to place itself in the path of the tunnel, observing ciphertext and traffic metadata and selectively dropping packets. WireGuard's end-to-end cryptography still prevents decryption or forgery of tunnel content, so the impact is loss of availability plus limited confidentiality, not key compromise. The fix removes the endpoint learning from this path entirely: the stale-session recovery is kept, but the handshake is sent only to an endpoint learnt from an authenticated message, falling back to the configured cfg_endpoint, and the message is dropped when neither is known. CONFIG_WIREGUARD is marked experimental and is not enabled by default. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79980 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-10-23 | 5.6 Medium |
| The DHCPv4 client in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c maintained its transaction identifier (iface->config.dhcpv4.xid) as a counter rather than as a per-transaction random value. It was seeded once with sys_rand32_get() in dhcpv4_start_internal(), incremented by one in dhcpv4_send_discover() and dhcpv4_send_decline(), and never changed by dhcpv4_send_request() — so every RENEWING and REBINDING exchange reused, unchanged, the identifier that had already appeared on the wire in the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER at boot, and where the identifier did move it moved predictably by one. RFC 2131 4.1 requires a single identifier per transaction, chosen so that clients are unlikely to collide. This identifier is the client's only unpredictable reply-validation token. net_dhcpv4_input() accepts a BOOTP reply on op, a matching xid, and a matching chaddr (the interface MAC, which is public); the UDP callback is registered with a wildcard remote address and port, and no server-identifier or source-address check is applied. An attacker who learns one identifier — for example any host on the same segment that sees the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER, or a DHCP server or relay on a network the device previously joined — therefore retains a valid token for the device's whole uptime, and can predict the identifiers of later exchanges, without having to observe the unicast renew traffic or race the legitimate server. A forged reply that passes those checks has effect regardless of client state, because dhcpv4_parse_options() applies its side effects before the state machine gate in dhcpv4_handle_reply(): the router option calls net_if_ipv4_set_gw() and the DNS option calls dns_resolve_reconfigure(). A single accepted datagram can thus repoint the device's default gateway and resolvers at attacker-controlled addresses, redirecting its traffic; during RENEWING or REBINDING a forged DHCPACK re-binds the lease with attacker-chosen parameters and a forged DHCPNAK removes the address and restarts configuration. The fix draws a fresh sys_rand32_get() value at each point where a transaction begins — entering SELECTING, RENEWING and REBINDING, and at the INIT/INIT-REBOOT entry taken when an interface with a lease goes down — while REQUESTING and DECLINE keep the identifier of the exchange they belong to, as RFC 2131 requires. As a side effect the client also no longer discards a slow server's offer after retransmitting a discover, and the initial-discover backoff now draws its own randomness instead of deriving it from the identifier. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46347 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 6.8 Medium |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. Prior to version 26.05, when a password reset link is visited, the application generates a replacement password in a predictable way and emails it to the account holder. The insufficient entropy allows the password to be brute-forced by an attacker who can approximate the server-side generation time. Exploiting this finding in isolation requires the victim to have triggered the reset themselves and the attacker to infer the server time from network or email metadata. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-83813 | 1 Twisted | 1 Twisted | 2026-10-23 | 3.1 Low |
| Twisted is an event-based framework for internet applications, supporting Python 3.6+. Prior to 26.10.0rc1, twisted.names.dns.DNSDatagramProtocol accepts a UDP DNS response for a pending query when its 16-bit transaction ID matches but does not verify that the response came from the queried host and port. An attacker able to deliver a packet to the resolver's listening port with the correct transaction ID can inject a forged answer. The standard twisted.names.client.Resolver uses a new random source port for each query, increasing off-path attack complexity, while applications that reuse a DNSDatagramProtocol instance expose only the transaction-ID search space after the first query. A successful forgery can redirect hostname resolution and enable mail interception, server-side request forgery, or man-in-the-middle positioning. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.0rc1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-115937 | 1 Craftcms | 1 Commerce-mollie | 2026-10-23 | 7.5 High |
| The Mollie webhook endpoint accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters and never verifies that they belong together: * commerceTransactionHash — selects which Craft Commerce transaction is completed * id — selects which Mollie payment is queried for its status An unauthenticated attacker holding any paid Mollie payment ID from the merchant’s account can pair it with any transaction hash. Commerce queries Mollie, sees status: paid, and marks the target transaction successful for that transaction’s full amount, regardless of how much was actually paid. | ||||
| CVE-2026-58497 | 2026-10-23 | N/A | ||
| Uni-CLI gives people and agents one command interface for websites, browsers, desktop applications, local tools, and MCP. Prior to version 0.225.2, Uni-CLI exposed the legacy JSON-RPC-over-HTTP MCP transport on loopback without validating browser Origin headers before routing requests. A malicious web page could send a CORS simple POST request, such as text/plain, to the local /mcp endpoint and deliver a JSON-RPC body to the dispatcher. If the user had started the local MCP HTTP transport, that page could drive tools/call requests against the user's local Uni-CLI server. The Streamable HTTP transport already enforced this browser-to-localhost boundary. The legacy stateless HTTP path did not, so the two HTTP transports had drifted. This issue is about the browser-to-localhost boundary; it does not change Uni-CLI's local-code-execution trust model. This issue has been patched in version 0.225.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56837 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-10-23 | 8.6 High |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.6.56 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's LinearBot starts a public webhook listener on 0.0.0.0 and treats LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET as optional. When the secret is absent, startup only logs a warning and _handle_webhook() skips Linear-Signature verification entirely. An unauthenticated network caller who can reach the webhook endpoint can submit a forged Linear-Event: AgentSession request. The forged request is parsed, scheduled for background processing, dispatched to _handle_agent_session(), and passed into BotSessionManager.chat(). The bot then attempts to post the agent response back to Linear under the configured bot token. The PoV is offline and deterministic. It does not contact Linear. It calls the webhook handler directly, monkey-patches the outbound Linear comment path, and proves both sides of the boundary. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59. | ||||
| CVE-2026-114612 | 1 Berriai | 1 Litellm | 2026-10-23 | 9.9 Critical |
| LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From 1.87.0 until 1.100.4, 1.101.3, 1.102.2, 1.103.1, and 1.104.0-rc.2, the proxy reuses one cryptographic context for at-rest secrets and session tokens, allowing an authenticated internal user to have crafted metadata containing a forged administrator credential encrypted and returned by the API-key flow. Replaying that ciphertext as a bearer token causes the proxy to trust the forged proxy administrator identity, permitting administrative access and arbitrary commands through the MCP stdio endpoint. Versions 1.87.0 through 1.90.x require EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN to be enabled, while versions after 1.91.0 are exploitable in the default configuration. This issue was fixed in LiteLLM 1.100.4, 1.101.3, 1.102.2, 1.103.1, and 1.104.0-rc.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-85818 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 11 23h2, Windows 11 23h2, Windows 11 24h2 and 10 more | 2026-10-23 | 9 Critical |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature in Windows Schannel allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-115374 | 1 Linuxcontainers | 1 Incus | 2026-10-23 | 7.1 High |
| Incus 7.0.0 before 7.0.2 and 7.1.0 before 7.5.0 contains a signature verification flaw in its built-in S3 server that allows presigned URL holders to inject unsigned x-amz-* headers. Attackers can add an unsigned X-Amz-Copy-Source header to a presigned upload URL to copy other bucket objects onto the granted key, disclosing their contents and ETags. | ||||
| CVE-2026-113800 | 1 Electron | 1 Electron | 2026-10-23 | 5.4 Medium |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.5, hid and usb permission checks made from an iframe caused setPermissionCheckHandler to receive the top-level frame's origin and details instead of the requesting frame's. An application that delegated hid or usb to a cross-origin untrusted iframe and allowed device access with origin-based logic could therefore grant that embedded frame access intended for the top-level page. This issue is fixed in versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.5. | ||||
| CVE-2026-115724 | 1 Videolan | 1 Vlc For Android | 2026-10-23 | 2.9 Low |
| VLC for Android before 3.7.2 contains a confused-deputy file overwrite vulnerability in FileUtils.getUri() that trusts content URIs based only on the com.fsck.k9.attachmentprovider or gmail-ls authority. A co-installed app without permissions can declare these authorities and send a crafted VIEW intent to the exported StartActivity, making VLC write attacker-chosen content under an attacker-chosen name in the shared Download directory, overwriting other apps' files when VLC holds All files access. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56832 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.2 to before version 4.6.59, praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval approves a pending dangerous tool call when it sees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is classified as approval, such as yes. As a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can approve a pending high-risk tool call by sending yes after the approval message appears. the same PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram messaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but the primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend's unthreaded channel cross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise request-bound. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59. | ||||